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THE INDIANA ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION ACT: AN
ENVIRONMENTALIST'S WEAPON IN NEED OF
REPAIR
We celebrate the earth.
We celebrate the seas that gave birth to life...
We pledge ourselves to the defense of the earth,
of its airs, of its waters,
of the life that moves upon it.
We shall defend it from the assault of machinery,
from the noxious gasses, the toxic wastes,
the subtle poisons...
from ourselves.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The 1960's saw a sudden explosion of concern for the environment.
The struggle of the Vietnam era conservationists survives today in the
voices of concerned individuals crying out for a liveable environment.2 In-
dustries pollute the atmosphere, water, and soil, while commercial develop-
ment swallows up unique natural resources.' Amid these consequences of
I. No DEPOSIT - No RETURN, MAN AND His ENVIRONMENT: A VIEW TOWARD SUR-
VIVAL 278 (H. Johnson ed. 1970).
2. See Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of Ad-
ministrative Law, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1970).
3. 115 CONG. REC. 29,066 (1969) (Statement of Sen. Jackson).
[Olver the past decade there have been some very remarkable changes in public
attitudes toward the manner in which the nation's resources are administered.
. . . These changes in public attitudes and the growing public awareness and
concern over man's limited natural resource base were perhaps best articulated dur-
ing the decade of the sixties by former Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall.
Secretary Udall made the inadequacy of the nation's knowledge, policies, priorities
and institutions for the adminstration of the public's resources and man's total envi-
ronment an important public issue. ...
We see increasing evidence of this inadequacy all around us: haphazard urban
and suburban growth; crowding, congestion and conditions within our central cities
which result in civil unrest and detract from man's social and psychological well-
being; the loss of open valuable spaces; inconsistent and, often, incoherent rural and
urban land use policies; critical air and water pollution problems; diminishing recre-
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man's rapid rise from fire to modern society is the environmentalist." Ne-
glected by the environmental agencies designed to serve his interests,' the
environmentalist was left without a weapon to fight the war against pollu-
tion until Congress and several state legislatures came to his aid.6
In response to the powerful environmental movement, in 1969 Con-
gress enacted the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).7 The enact-
ment of NEPA was predicated upon the widespread belief that while the
quality of the nation's environment was rapidly deteriorating, the federal
agencies designed to preserve the environment were actually speeding up
rather than impeding the process of decay.8 NEPA requires all federal
agencies to consider the environmental consequences of federal activities
and to provide the public with information of any adverse environmental
effects from these activities.9
To supplement NEPA, many states, including Indiana, enacted provi-
sions known as state environmental protection acts (SEPAs). ° These acts
ational opportunity; continuing soil erosion; the degradation of unique ecosystem;
needless deforestation; the decline and extinction of fish and wildlife species; falter-
ing and poorly designed transportation systems; poor architectural design and ugli-
ness in private and public structures; rising levels of noise; the continued prolifera-
tion of pesticides and chemicals without adequate consideration of the consequences;
radiation hazards; thermal pollution; and increasingly ugly landscape cluttered with
bill boards, powerlines, and junkyards; growing scarcity of essential resources; and
many, many other environmental quality problems.
Id. at 29,066-67.
4. See Hatch, Massachusetts and Michigan: Two States With An Answer, 6 LINCOLN
L. REV. 119, 126 (1971).
5. See infra notes 8 and 118-21 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 7-16 and accompanying text.
7. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-35, 4341-47,
4361-70 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
8. See Note, Standing on the Side of the Environment: A Statutory Prescription For
Citizen Participation, I ECOLOGY L.Q. 561, 561-67 (1971). "A primary purpose of NEPA is
to restore public confidence in the Federal Government's capacity to achieve important public
purposes and objectives and at the same time to maintain and enhance the quality of the
environment." S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1969).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). "The public availability of impact
statements, and of agency comments on them, has provided an extraordinarily effective vehicle
for making nongovernmental groups and private citizens aware of government actions affecting
them, and for bringing their preferences as well as their knowledge to bear upon those deci-
sions." McGarity, The Courts, The Agencies and NEPA Threshold Issues, 55 TEx. L. REV.
801, 807 n.20 (1977).
10. These state environmental protection acts are also referred to as citizen-suit stand-
ing provisions. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-14 to -20 (West 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
403.412 (West 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 §§ 1031-34 (Smith-Hurd 1977 & Supp.
1986); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-6-1-1 to -6 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987); MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 732, § 10A (West 1971); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 691.1201-.1207 (West 1987);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 116B.01-.13 (West 1987); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 41.540-.570 (1986);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:35A-l to -14 (West Supp. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 34A-
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provide virtually everyone with standing to sue any alleged polluter for de-
claratory or injunctive relief in order to protect the state's environment."
Although these state statutes differ in detail,'2 all SEPAs share the same
objectives of improving the quality of environmental decision-making and
expanding the role of the private citizen in managing natural resources.13
The intended result of SEPAs is to avoid conventional standing limitations14
and thereby provide greater policing of actions detrimental to the environ-
ment. 5 While most SEPAs grant standing to businesses, corporations, and
agencies, the major focus and strength of these provisions is the ordinary
citizen's right to challenge local, small-scale problems. 6
Like other SEPAs, the Indiana Environmental Protection Act
10-1 to -15 (1986).
II. See DiMento, Citizens Environmental Legislation in the States: An Overview, 53
DET. J. OF URB. LAw 413, 418 (1976).
12. A variety of differences exist among SEPAs. For example, the Michigan SEPA
allows the plaintiff direct standing before the court. In contrast, the Indiana Act requires
plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies before they have access to the courts. See infra
notes 67, 89-92 and 115 and accompanying text. Also, the Michigan, Connecticut and Nevada
courts have de novo review power of the environmental agency rules and regulations while the
Indiana courts may not examine and reject administrative standards. The Michigan courts
may even promulgate new standards when they consider existing ones unreasonable. The other
state courts, including Indiana, are not given such broad power under their SEPAs. See infra
notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
Regardless of the differing procedural innovations, the potential for citizen involvement in
the process of environmental control is considerable under most SEPAs and was one intended
result of their development. See DiMento, supra note 11, at 418-19.
13. DiMento, Citizen Environmental Litigation and the Administrative Process: Em-
pirical Findings, Remaining Issues and a Direction for Future Research, 1977 DUKE L.J. 409,
428.
14. DiMento, supra note II, at 416-18. See infra notes 46-47 and 52 and accompany-
ing text.
15. DiMento, supra note II, at 416-18. See infra notes 56-57 and 144-46 and accom-
panying text.
16. The most frequent use and success of SEPAs is their application to local issues. See
Anderson v. State Highway Comm'n, No. 15609-C (lngham County Cir. Ct., filed May 8,
1973) (Michigan's SEPA used to save a stand of shade trees), cited in DiMento, supra note
11, at 429 n.69; Minn. Public Interest Research Group v. White Bear Rod and Gun Club, 257
N.W.2d 762 (Minn. 1977) (Minnesota's SEPA enlisted to enjoin a gun club from operating
near a residential area); Crystal Lake Resort Ass'n v. Village of Beulah, No. 807 (Benzie
County Cir. Ct., filed May 8, 1973) (Michigan's SEPA used to challenge the routing plans of
a highway through a small resort town), cited in DiMento, supra note 11, at 430 n.70. But see
Roberts v. Michigan, No. 12428-C (Ingham County Cir. Ct., filed Oct. 23, 1970) (plaintiff
invoked MEPA to sue the Highway Department and Secretary of State for failure to control
automobile pollution and asked for an injunction against all drivers until more efficient stan-
dards could be developed), cited in Sax & Connor, Michigan's Environmental Protection Act
of 1970: A Progress Report, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1004, 1083 (1972); Marshall v. Consumers
Power Co., No. 3-16-150 (Jackson County Cir. Ct., filed March 28, 1973) (a Michigan resi-
dent unsuccessfully tried to use MEPA to challenge the licensing of nuclear power plants in
the state), cited in DiMento, supra note 11, at 429 n.66.
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(IEPA),'" statutorily confers standing on all legal entities and individuals to
sue any alleged polluter, regardless of whether the plaintiff is personally
harmed by the defendant's activities. 8 Despite the broad opportunities this
17. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-6-1-1 to -6 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987). The Indiana statute
appears in the Indiana Code under a chapter entitled "Standing to Sue." Although not its
official name, it will be referred to in this note as IEPA, an acronym consistent with other
SEPAs.
18. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-6-1-1 to -6 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987) provides:
Sec. I. (a) The attorney general of the state of Indiana, or any state, city, town,
county, or local agency or officer vested with the authority to seek judicial relief, any
citizen of the state of Indiana, or any corporation, partnership, or association maintaining
an office in the state of Indiana may maintain an action for declaratory and equitable
relief in the name of the state of Indiana against any individual, partnership, copartner-
ship, firm, company, corporation, association, joint stock company, trust, estate, state
agency, or officer, city town, county, or local governmental unit, agency or official, or any
other legal entity or their legal representative, agent or assigns, for the protection of the
environment of the state from significant pollution, impairment, or destruction. Any citi-
zen, partnership, corporation, association, or public officer or agency, as a condition pre-
cedent to maintaining such action, shall give notice in writing by registered or certified
mail to the department of natural resources and the department of environmental man-
agement or its successor agency in environmental affairs, and to the attorney general of
the state, who shall promptly notify all state administrative agencies having jurisdiction
over or control of the pollution, impairment, destruction, or protection of the environment
for which relief is sought.
(b) No action shall be maintained under this chapter unless the adminis-
trative agency to whom such notice was given and having jurisdiction as set out in sub-
section (a) fails to investigate and conduct a hearing to determine whether or not the
accused is a polluter as defined by law or rule. The complainant shall be joined as a
party. If the agency fails to hold a hearing and make a final determination within one
hundred eighty (180) days after receipt of notice by the attorney general as provided in
subsection (a), action may be maintained and such agency need not be joined as a party
defendant.
(c) If the administrative agency holds a hearing and makes a final determi-
nation within one hundred eighty (180) days, an appeal from its action may be taken in
the manner prescribed by law.
(d) In any administrative, licensing, or other such proceeding, and in any
action for judicial review thereof which is made available by law, the attorney general of
the state of Indiana, or any state, city, town, county, or local agency or officer vested with
the authority to seek judicial relief, any citizen of the state of Indiana, or any corpora-
tion, partnership, or association maintaining an office in the state of Indiana shall be
permitted to intervene as a party upon the filing of a verified pleading asserting that the
proceeding or action for judicial review involves conduct, programs, or products which
may have the effect of significantly impairing, polluting, or destroying the environment of
the state.
(e) In any such administrative, licensing, or other such procedure, the
agency shall consider the alleged significant impairment, pollution, or destruction of the
environment of the state, and no conduct, program or product shall be authorized, ap-
proved, or permitted to continue which does, or is reasonably likely to, have such effect so
long as there is a feasible and prudent alternative consistent with the reasonable require-
ments of the public health, safety, and welfare.
(f) In any action for judicial review of any proceedings as described in
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 22, No. 1 [1987], Art. 5
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statute creates for Indiana citizens to privately enforce environmental law,
the provision has stirred virtually no response. Since its enactment in 1971,
only three cases have reported use of IEPA, each initiated by the same
plaintiff. The most recent case dates back to 1976.19 Unfortunately, these
cases offer little substantive interpretation of the statute. Although several
commentators have noted that IEPA is a failure, no one has yet concluded
why this statute - designed to give Indiana citizens an opportunity to pro-
subsection (c), the court shall, in addition to any other duties imposed upon it by law,
grant review of claims that the conduct, program, or product under review has, or is
reasonably likely to impair, significantly pollute, or destroy the environment of the state.
Sec. 2. (a) In any action maintained under section I of this chapter, whenever the
petitioner shall have made a prima facie showing that the conduct of the respondent has,
or is reasonably likely to impair, pollute, or destroy the environment of the state, the
respondent shall have the burden of establishing:
(I) where there is an applicable rule adopted by an agency of the state setting
standards for pollution, impairment or destruction, or for antipollution devices, compli-
ance with such rule which shall constitute a prima facie defense to petitioner's claim; or
(2) where there is no applicable rule, that there is no feasible and prudent alterna-
tive and that the conduct, program, or product at issue is consistent with and reasonably
required for the promotion of the public health, safety, and welfare in light of the state's
paramount concern for the protection of its environment from pollution, impairment, or
destruction.
(b) Upon making such proof, said respondent shall have rebutted the
prima facie showing, and the petitioner shall have the burden of going forward with the
evidence.
Sec. 3. Such action shall be brought in a circuit or superior court in the county in
which the significant pollution, impairment or destruction is alleged to have occurred.
Sec. 4. The court may appoint a master or referee, who shall be a disinterested
person and technically qualified, to take testimony and make a report to the court in any
such action. The costs thereof may be apportioned to the parties if the interests of justice
require.
Sec. 5. The court may grant temporary and permanent equitable relief, or may
impose such conditions upon the respondent as are required to protect the environment of
the state from pollution, impairment, and destruction.
Sec. 6. In any action where a petitioner or intervenor seeking judicial adjudication
as provided by this chapter has failed to intervene in any administrative, licensing or
other such proceedings, the court may remit such petitioner, or intervenor to such pro-
ceeding for amplification of the record therein, and may order the granting of interven-
tion and the granting of review therein as provided in section I of this chapter:
Provided, That where intervention was available in such administrative, licensing or other
such proceedings, and where the petitioner or intervenor seeking judicial adjudication
hereunder willfully and inexcusably refused intervention therein, the court may dismiss
the action with prejudice to the petitioner or intervenor.
19. Sekerez v. U.S. Reduction Co., 168 Ind. App. 526, 344 N.E.2d 102 (1976);
Sekerez v. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co., 166 Ind. App. 563, 337 N.E.2d 521 (1975);
Sekerez v. U.S. Steel Corp., 316 N.E.2d 413 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974).
20. Youngstown is the only case in which the court interprets any of IEPA's provisions.
Youngstown, 166 Ind. App. 563, 337 N.E.2d 521. See infra notes 78-80 and 103 and accom-
panying text.
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tect their environment - is an impotent weapon for fighting pollution.2
This note explores the ineffectiveness of IEPA in the context of other
SEPAs, primarily the Michigan Environmental Protection Act (MEPA),22
the leading citizen suit statute in the country.23 The thesis of this paper is
that the procedural requirements of IEPA and the Indiana judiciary's atti-
tude toward the Act destroy any opportunity for meaningful judicial and
public involvement in protecting the state's environment. This note first ex-
amines several advantages that Indiana and other states possess by virtue of
having a SEPA.24 Next, how the environmental plaintiff may use the stat-
ute is explored.25 The third section examines several characteristics of
IEPA which, in light of other SEPAs, are impeding use of the statute. 26
Finally, changes are suggested which, if adopted, will transform the cur-
rently unused IEPA into an effective weapon in the arsenal for fighting
21. Two possible reasons IEPA is not working are because "significant" pollution, im-
plying a high burden of proof, is required and also because the defendant may rebut this
showing, if made, through evidence of "compliance with applicable pollution standards."
Abrams, Threshold of Harm in Environmental Litigation: The Michigan Environmental Pro-
tection Act As A Model of a Minimal Requirement, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 107, 125
(1983). See infra note 83 and accompanying text. IEPA's prerequisites of notifying various
agencies and exhausting administrative remedies are distasteful to plaintiffs. Moreover, the
very restrictive view of standing advanced by the court in Youngstown severely limits use of
the provision. Shaffer, Survey of Administrative Law, 10 IND. L. REV. 37, 46-48 (1976). See
infra text accompanying notes 89-103. "Indiana citizens are either unaware of this statute or,
alternatively, are choosing not to use it because they find unpalatable the 180 day waiting
period to maintain an action in court." Note, Citizen Standing in Environmental Licensing
Procedures, 18 IND. L. REv. 989, 1026 n.241 (1985). See infra text accompanying notes 89-
95. Under IEPA, environmental litigation is restricted to a limited set of circumstances -
only when the citizen-litigant has exhausted all administrative remedies. DiMento, supra note
13, at 412.
22. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 691.1201-.1207 (West 1987). For complete text see
infra note 113.
23. MEPA is a landmark piece of environmental legislation in the United States. Let-
ter from Ralph A. MacMullen, Director, Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources, to the Editor,
State Journal, Lansing (Jan. 18, 1972), cited in Sax & Connor, supra note 16, at 1004. The
influence of Professor Joseph Sax, the drafter of MEPA, has been felt across the country.
Many states now have enacted some version of MEPA. In addition, the federal government
even considered enacting an EPA based on MEPA. S. 1104, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). See
Ray v. Mason County Drain Comm'r, 393 Mich. 294, 224 N.W.2d 883 (1975). "Michigan's
EPA was the first legislation of its kind and has attracted worldwide attention. The act has
also served as a model for other states in formulating environmental legislation." Id. at 304-05,
224 N.W.2d at 887. The passage of the Act received worldwide press coverage. See, e.g.,
Time, August 24, 1970, at 37; N.Y. Times, August 3, 1970, at 36, col. 2; Le Courrier
(UNESCO), July, 1971, at 20; Proceedings Int'l Symposium on Environmental Disruption,
Tokyo, 1970 (Asahi Evening News, Tokyo), cited in Ray, 393 Mich. at 304 n.4, 224 N.W.2d
at 887 n.4.
24. See infra notes 28-63 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 64-85 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 89-188 and accompanying text.
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environmental deterioration."'
II. THE SEPA ADVANTAGE
A. The Relative Sphere of Regulation Under NEPA, "Little NEPAs"
and SEPAs
NEPA is a major means of environmental regulation. 28 Nevertheless,
the thresholds and the limited subject matter of NEPA highlight the differ-
ences between the goals and purposes of NEPA as compared to SEPAs.2 9
NEPA requires federal agencies to file Environmental Impact Statements
(EIS) which discuss the environmental consequences of federal actions.30
Because NEPA only applies to major federal actions that significantly af-
fect the environment, NEPA monitors a limited subject matter."' Neither
private behavior nor federal activities defined as having less than a signifi-
cant impact on the environment qualify for NEPA protection.3 2
In contrast to NEPA's concern with the environmental consequences of
an unwieldy national bureaucracy, SEPAs apply to more local situations.
Although perhaps not as newsworthy as suits brought under NEPA, many
local issues are of substantial environmental consequence. 3 In general,
27. See infra notes 188-230 and accompanying text.
28. One commentator hails NEPA as an environmental bill of rights due to its broad
applicability to federal actions. Coggins, Preparing An Environmental Impact Lawsuit, Part :
Defining a Claim for Relief Under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 58 IOwA
L. REV. 277, 287 (1972).
29. Abrams, supra note 21, at 129 n.164.
30. NEPA establishes procedures for federal agencies to follow when considering fed-
eral action. Every agency must file an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for "proposals
for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the environment." 42
U.S.C. § 4332(c) (Law Co-op. 1982 & Supp. 111 1985).
The EIS is a detailed statement including:
(i) The environmental impact of the proposed action;
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal
be implemented;
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action;
(iv) the relationship between short-term use of man's environment and the mainte-
nance and enhancement of long-term productivity; and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be in-
volved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Id.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (Law Co-op. 1982 & Supp. 111 1985). See Abrams, supra
note 21, at 129.
32. See Movement Against Destruction v. Volpe, 361 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Md. 1973),
afid, 500 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1974) (NEPA could not be used to challenge highway construc-
tion since letter from federal highway administrator approving construction did not constitute
major federal action under NEPA). This construction may have local environmental effects,
however, which may be considered under a SEPA.
33. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. EPAs have preserved local water quality
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SEPAs are designed to create a broad, private right of action without the
limits set forth in NEPA. " The burden of proof a plaintiff must sustain to
use a SEPA, although different from state to state, is substantially lower
than the threshold of harm a plaintiff must prove under NEPA. 5 This re-
laxed burden of proof is consistent with the strength of SEPAs demon-
strated in other states - a vitally important tool that is indispensable for
improving environmental protection on a local level. 6
Furthermore, NEPA provides for less citizen involvement than most
SEPAs. Under NEPA, citizens only tangentially enter the process of evalu-
ating an activity's adverse effect on the environment. Although citizens may
criticize the EIS87 prepared by an agency, they are limited to responding to
the agency's study.3 8 In contrast, one goal of SEPAs is to provide the public
with an opportunity to become directly involved in managing the state's
resources.3 9 SEPAs arm the citizen with direct power to initiate proceedings
against an alleged polluter, thereby increasing the number of potential
guardians of the environment."0
Several states have enacted Environmental Policy Statutes, often called
"little NEPAs," that require the filing an an EIS at the state or local
and unique natural resources. These statutes also have guided development to protect environ-
mental qualities. DiMento, supra note I1, at 447. See generally Sax & Connor, supra note 16.
34. For explanation of these limits, see supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text. Al-
though some SEPAs, including IEPA, contain modifiers such as "unreasonable," "material,"
or "significant" to describe the type of pollution qualifying as a violation of the act, many
courts have construed these terms to preclude frivolous or petty claims. See infra notes 225-28
and accompanying text.
35. Abrams, supra note 21, at 128-29. See infra text accompanying notes 165-88.
36. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
37. The EIS process provides the public with information regarding agency actions and
their environmental consequences. When they have complaints, however, the public's only re-
course is to petition agencies or Congress about the proposed action. See Abrams, supra note
21, at 128 n.164. See also supra note 30 and accompanying text.
38. Citizens may also challenge decisions not to prepare an EIS. They may not initiate
the EIS process, however, and are restricted to responding to the agency sponsoring the pro-
ject. These rights are governed by the Admin. Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-56; 702-06
(Law Co-op. 1982 & Supp. 1985). The narrow "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review
binds a federal court when reviewing agency decisions not to prepare an EIS.
Agency response to the public is typically poor, as one notewriter has observed:
As the problems of the nation and the states multiplied, the laws became more prolix
and the discretion granted administrators became greater and greater. . . .Management
of natural forests and national parks is left to federal agencies which in turn promulgate
regulations governing the use of these properties but seldom allow a public voice to be
heard against any plan of the agency.
Note, supra note 8, at 567 n.24. "Achieving meaningful public participation in Federal agency
decisions that have an impact on the environment sedms to be one of the most important
challenges facing Federal agencies." McGarity, supra note 9, at 807 n.20.
39. DiMento, supra note 13, at 428 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 54-57, 144-46 and accompanying text.
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level.41 In those states, including Indiana,'4 2 where the policy act applies
41. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21174 (West 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 229-1
to -Ih (West 1985); HAW. REV. STAT. § 343-1 (1985); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-1-10-1 to -8
(West 1983 & Supp. 1987); MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 1-301 to -305 (1983); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 30, § 61, 62-62H (West 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ I 16D.01 - .07 (West
1987); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-1-101 to -105, § 75-1-201 (1985); NY ENVTL. CONSERV.
LAW §§ 8-0101 to -0117 (McKinney 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § I 13A-I (1983); P.R. LAWS
ANN. tit. 12, §9 1121-1127; S.D. CODE ANN. §§ 34A-9-1 to -12 (Law Co-op. 1986); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 10-17.107 to .112 (1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 43-21C.010 - .910
(1983); WIs. STAT. ANN. § .II (West 1986).
42. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-1-10-1 to -8 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987) provides:
Sec.l. The purposes of this chapter are: to declare a state policy which will en-
courage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to pro-
mote effort which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and
stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological
systems and natural resources important to the state.
Sec.2.(a) The General Assembly, recognizing the profound impact of man's activ-
ity on the interrelations of all components of the natural environment, particularly the
profound influences of population growth, high-density urbanization, industrial expansion,
resource exploitation, and new and expanding technological advances and recognizing
further the critical importance of restoring and maintaining environmental quality to the
overall welfare and development of man, declares that it is the continuing policy of the
state of Indiana, in co-operation with the federal and local governments, and other con-
cerned public and private organizations, to use all practicable means and measures, in-
cluding financial and technical assistance, in a manner calculated to foster and promote
the general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can
exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of
present and future generations of Indiana citizens.
(b) In order to carry out the policy set forth in this chapter, it is the continu-
ing responsibility of the State of Indiana to use all practical means, consistent with other
essential considerations of state policy, to improve and coordinate state plans, functions,
programs and resources to the end that he state may:
(I) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environ-
ment for succeeding generations;
(2) assure for all citizens of Indiana safe, healthful, productive, and es-
thetically and culturally pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without
degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our na-
tional heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diver-
sity, and variety of individual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which will
permit high standards of living and a wise sharing of life's amenities; and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maxi-
mum attainable recycling of depletable resources.
(c) The General Assembly recognizes that each person should enjoy a health-
ful environment and that each person has a responsibility to contribute to the preserva-
tion and enhancement of the environment.
Sec.3 The general assembly authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent
possible:
(I) the policies, rules, and laws of the state of Indiana shall be interpreted
and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in the chapter; and
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exclusively to state'agencies, only those state activities with "significant"
(2) all agencies of the state shall:
(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the in-
tegrated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental design arts in plan-
ning and decision-making which may have an impact on man's environment;
(B) identify and develop methods and procedures which will insure that un-
quantified environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration in
decision-making with economic and technical considerations;
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposal for legislation
and other major state actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on:
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action;
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented;
(iii) alternatives to the proposed actions;
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and
the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity; and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources which would
be involved if the proposed action should be implemented.
(Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible state official shall consult
with and obtain the comments of any state agency which has jurisdiction by law or spe-
cial expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved. Copies of such state-
ment and the comments and views of the appropriate federal, state, and local agencies,
which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental standards, shall be made
available to the governor and to the public and shall accompany the proposal through the
agency review process. The air pollution control board, water pollution control board, and
solid waste management board shall by rule define which actions constitute a major state
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.)
(D) study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recommend
courses of action in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning alterna-
tives uses of available resources;
(E) recognize the long-range character of environmental problems and,
where consistent with the policy of the state, lend appropriate support to initiatives, reso-
lution, and programs designed to maximize state cooperation in anticipating and prevent-
ing a decline in the quality of mankind's environment;
(F) make available to counties, municipalities, institutions, and individuals
advice and information useful in restoring, maintaining, and enhancing the quality of the
environment; and
(G) initiate and utilize ecological information in the planning and develop-
ment of resource-oriented projects.
Sec.4 All agencies of the state shall review their statutory authority, administrative
rules, and current policies and procedures for the purpose of determining whether there
are any deficiencies or inconsistencies which prohibit full compliance with the purposes
and provisions of this chapter.
Sec.5 Nothing in section 3 and 4 of this chapter shall in any way affect the specific
statutory obligations of any state agency:
(I) to comply with criteria or standards of environmental quality;
(2) to coordinate or consult with any other federal or state agency; or
(3) to act, or refrain from acting contingent upon the recommendations or cer-
tification of any other federal or state agency.
Sec.6 Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to require an environmental im-
pact statement for the issuance of a license or permit by any agency of the state.
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consequences for the environment are addressed - neither private nor less
than significant state behavior is checked. 43 Similar to NEPA, these limited
statutes cannot remedy the local environmental abuse that SEPAs are
meant to address.
4
4
B. The Relative Sphere of Regulation Under the Common Law and
SEPAs
Another distinct advantage of SEPAs stems from the inability of the
common law to deal with many environmental issues.45 Although the com-
mon law theories of trespass, private nuisance, and public nuisance are all
theoretically viable means of abating pollution, these causes of action are
actually of very limited usefulness because each requires the environmental
plaintiff to show standing.4 To the extent that a plaintiff must prove actual
Sec.7. Policies and goals set forth in this chapter are supplementary to those set
forth in existing authorizations of State agencies.
Sec.8. Any state agency that is required by the National Environmental Policy Act
(P.L. 91-190) to file a federal environmental impact statement shall not be required to
file a statement with the state government as provided under sections 3 and 4 of this
chapter, unless the action contemplated requires state legislation or state appropriations.
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-1-10-1 to -8 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987).
43. The Environmental Policy Acts in California, Hawaii, New York, and Washington
apply the impact statement requirement to local governments as well as state governments.
Under these statutes, impact statements must be filed on private land development, a require-
ment which has become very controversial in these states. This extension of the EIS to private
development is in addition to the requirement that private developers meet zoning and other
prerequisites in the local land use control process. Unfortunately, Indiana does not offer the
additional protection of requiring local agencies to file impact statements on private activity
which affects the environment. D. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW & LITIGATION, THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT (1984).
44. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
45. SEPAs create private remedies for redressing polluters without the encumbered
common law theories of nuisance and trespass. See Fitzpatrick, Private Legal Remedies To
Air Pollution in Illinois, 59 ILL. B.J. 746, 756-57 (1971).
46. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (standing requires that a plaintiff show a le-
gally protected interest which has been violated so that he is harmed in some tangible way).
Several elements must be present before a plaintiff has standing in a common law trespass
action. See State ex rel. Green v. Gibson Circuit Court, 246 Ind. 446, 206 N.E.2d 135 (1965)
(because trespass actions are possessory in nature, the plaintiff must have a property interest
and must prove that his exclusive rights to chattel or land have been violated in order to have
standing). Also, the defendant's act must be an invasion of tangible matter to use the trespass
theory. See Metzger v. Penn. Ohio & Detroit Railroad Co., 147 Ohio St. 406, 66 N.E.2d 203
(1946) (smoke insufficient invasion for trespass because not tangible); Amphitheatres, Inc. v.
Portland Meadows, 184 Or. 336, 198 P.2d 847 (1948) (light insufficient invasion for trespass
since not tangible); Waschak v. Moffat, 379 Pa. 441, 109 A.2d 310 (1954) (gas insufficient
invasion for trespass because not tangible).
Standing is often a bar to suits brought under private nuisance. See Sans v. Ramsey Golf
& Country Club, 20 N.J. 438, 149 A.2d 599 (1959) (the damage the plaintiff suffers must be
distinct from and more severe than that which the general public suffers). Several additional
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personal injury, challenging many environmentally-damaging activities is
difficult.'7
Consider an individual who tries to sue under nuisance law to abate
industrial pollution in his town. Because the contamination is equally harm-
ful to everyone in the community, his case will probably be dismissed for
lack of standing."8 It is insufficient that this individual suffers the same in-
convenience and harm as the general public.' 9 If no identifiable party has
the individual injury required to prove standing, the damage will go un-
abated5" unless the Attorney General for the state or another official with
elements must be present to maintain a private nuisance action. The plaintiff must possess a
property interest and must show that the defendant's conduct substantially and unreasonably
interferes with the plaintiff's use of his property. The plaintiff must also prove that his damage
is greater than any benefit derived from defendant's activities. Id. at 448-49, 149 A.2d at 605.
There are several difficulties in obtaining standing under public nuisance as well. See Spur
Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972). Plain-
tiff may bring a public nuisance action when damage to his property is shared by a significant
number of others in the area. The plaintiff's case will be dismissed for lack of standing, how-
ever, if his injury is not distinct and separate from the injury to the public at large. Another
disadvantage of public nuisance lies in the number of people who must be affected before an
alleged nuisance is considered public. Id. at 184, 494 P.2d at 705-06.
47. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). The case was dismissed because
the plaintiff environmental group lacked standing. They failed to show that they used the
national park allegedly being polluted; they were not personally harmed. To have standing, the
injured interest may be conservational or aesthetic, as well as economic. However, the plaintiff
himself must still suffer an injury. See also United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1972). Here an environmental group had stand-
ing to sue the ICC for increasing railroad freight rates which would lead to an increase in non-
recyclable commodities resulting in the need to use more natural resources to produce such
goods. The environmental group used the forests, streams, and parks which would be affected
by the rate increase; therefore, they were personally affected and had standing.
48. Note, supra note 8, at 577. See Schroder v. City of Lincoln, 155 Neb. 599, 52
N.W.2d 808 (1952) (private individual could not maintain action for public nuisance against
city for installing an automatic bank teller on sidewalk in absence of showing he sustained
some special injury distinct from that suffered by the public).
49. Generally, the plaintiff's damage must differ in kind, rather than degree, from that
shared by the general public. See Poulos v. Dover Boiler & Plate Fabrications, 5 N.J. 580, 76
A.2d 808 (1950) (fact that plaintiff used a navigable stream five times as often as everyone
else did not give him a right of action); Bouquet v. Hackensack Water Co., 90 N.J. 203, 101
A. 379 (1916) (fact that plaintiff used a highway more frequently than others did not give him
a right of action). In some instances, however, a court will recognize plaintiff's standing when
the nuisance is a private one as well as a public one. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE
LAW OF TORTS, 648 (5th ed. 1984).
50. See W. PROSSER, supra note 49, at 646. "[T]here might be cases of environmental
degradation in remote wilderness areas, where no individual may be able to establish material
injury. Or there may be serious conflicts between the interests of those suffering immediate
material injury and other, more remotely involved interests that should nonetheless be consid-
ered." Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669,
1734-47 (1975). Under SEPAs, however, individuals may take the part of private Attorneys
General thereby circumventing the common law standing requirements. See Note, supra note
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 22, No. 1 [1987], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol22/iss1/5
1987] INDIANA ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 161
similar authority steps in. As a consequence, under the common law theo-
ries much pollution goes unchecked and many polluters escape legal
accountability.51
By statutorily granting standing to plaintiffs, regardless of whether
traditional injury-in-fact exists or not, SEPAs are a more useful weapon for
fighting pollution than the common law theories.52 These provisions allow a
plaintiff to obtain relief on behalf of the public interest without proving the
technical standing requirements of the common law. Therefore, SEPAs are
a vital means of achieving environmental quality.53
C. Policy Justifications for SEPAs
Several strong policy arguments justify the existence of a SEPA. The
sheer importance of protecting the state's environment justifies the creation
of a statute that will improve environmental control." Preservation of natu-
8.
51. "[The legal profession must go into the courts and argue that .. .pollution must
be prohibited not because it may or may not constitute a trespass, or some other common law
tort, but because it violates a fundamental right, the right to life ... " These rights have been
smothered "in the straight-jacket restrictions of nuisance, trespass. ... Fitzpatrick, supra
note 45, at 758.
The recently adopted Environmental Protection Act, creates an additional private remedy
...by granting a right to any person, whether or not injured, to file a complaint.
Fitzpatrick, supra note 45, at 756.
[Tihe common law provisions for private citizen response to environmental problems are
limited by technical, legal requirements and hobbled by the complex nature of environ-
mental problems which are not easily characterized as causing personal injury. With this
conceptual inability of the common law to deal with twentieth century environmental
problems, the private citizen must ordinarily look to a statutory provision of standing, and
where it does not exist, he is left without a remedy.
Note, supra note 8, at 579.
52. See DiMento, supra note 13, at 412-13. "At a time when preservation of the envi-
ronment is one of the most pressing issues of the day, we can ill afford to bar cases involving
major public interests on narrow technical grounds." Oakes, Environmental Litigation: Cur-
rent Development and Suggestions for the Future, 5 CONN. L. REV. 531, 536 (1973).
53. See Note, supra note 8, at 561.
54. For evidence of the vast wasteland developing throughout the United States war-
ranting new measures to protect the environment, see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
See also McCloud v. City of Lansing, No. 13057-C, (lngham County Cir. Ct., Decision, May
14, 1971). The plaintiffs challenged the routing of a utility line through a public park. The
court complimented the plaintiff for his environmental concern: "'The plaintiff.., put it well
with reference to the . . . public interest' " in the environment, " 'an interest which is there to
be protected, an interest which [the plaintiff) possesses . . . and an interest which our children
born and yet to be born possess. . . .I commend [the plaintiff] for bringing this litigation' ",
cited in Sax & DiMento, Environmental Citizens Suits: Three Years' Experience Under the
Michigan Environmental Protection Act, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. I, 36 (1974).
It is a timely and important concern that courts permit interested individuals and groups
to defend the environment through litigation. The Michigan and Massachusetts SEPAs are the
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ral resources is the truest form of defending the nation.5 5 By affording the
public the opportunity to sue alleged polluters, the efforts of the environ-
mental agencies are supplemented5" which, in turn, increases the likelihood
that maximum defense of the environment will be achieved. The greater the
number of guardians with authority to vindicate the public interest in envi-
ronmental protection, the greater the ability to hold polluters accountable. 57
In addition to the positive cumulative effect of allowing citizens to sue
polluters, SEPAs allow the ordinary individual, who is typically unable to
influence state representatives or to buy slick advertising in the media, to
plead his case.58 For example, a new highway may be the latest link in a
grandiose transportation network to an administrative official, whereas it
may serve as an annoying, dangerous development to the residential neigh-
borhood that it divides .5 A small stream or forest, which developers view as
a mere hindrance to plans for a sprawling new shopping center, is often a
special source of joy and beauty to nature lovers who view its destruction as
substantial environmental damage. ° Although these are simple values, they
are as important to a growing segment of the American public as the
growth of commercialism and industry prevalent today."1 Through SEPAs,
those who hold these often overlooked values have means of redressing their
beginnings of putting words into action toward man's improvement of the environment that he
has damaged and destroyed. Hatch, supra note 4, at 126.
55. Preservation of our homeland is not a partisan issue. It demands attention and
concern from all Americans of every political persuasion. Protecting our soil, air, and water is
a more valid form of national defense than most weapon systems. "If we ourselves lay waste to
our country, ravaging the land that is our home, what will there be left for 'star wars' to
defend?" Kean, The Environmental Movement in 1985: Between NEPA and 2000, 10 COLUM.
J. OF ENVTL. L. 199, 200 (1985).
56. "[B]roadening standing to allow the private citizen to complement agency action is
necessary because administrative bodies cannot carry the entire burden of restoring and main-
taining the public domain." Note, supra note 8, at 576.
57. "Citizen monitoring and enforcement, with ample precedent in antitrust and securi-
ties fraud litigation, add a healthy, fresh dimension to state and local abatement efforts. Soci-
ety is in no position to refuse pollution monitoring and enforcement by so widely distributed
and resourceful a staff as its own citizenry." McGregor, Private Enforcement of Environmen-
tal Law: An Analysis of the Massachusetts Citizen Suit Statute, I ENVTL. AFF. 606, 621
(1972). "When regulators either will not or cannot do the job, it is up to citizens to do it. And
the best form of 'self-help' I know of is a broad 'citizens-right-to-sue' law." Kean, supra note
55, at 207.
58. Sax & Connor, supra note 16, at 1081. See Note, supra note 8, at 570.
59. See Crystal Lake Resort Ass'n v. Village of Beulah, No. 807 (Benzie County Cir.
Ct., filed May 8, 1973), cited in DiMento, supra note 11, at 430 n.70. See also Tri-Cities
Environmental Action Council v. A. Reenders Sons, Inc., No. 2737 (Ottawa County Cir. Ct.,
filed Feb. 26, 1973) (challenge under MEPA to a highway routing plan), cited in DiMento,
supra note 11, at 430 n.70.
60. See Sax & Connor, supra note 16, at 1081.
61. Id.
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grievances which have been unnoticed or ignored.6' The environmentalist
finally has some power to control the quality of his environment.13
III. THE INDIANA ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT
A. The Statute Itself
Consistent with most SEPAs, IEPA confers standing on individuals
and various entities to sue any polluter in the courts of the county where
the pollution occurred.6" The courts may grant temporary and permanent
equitable relief in the form of a declaratory judgment or an injunction.65
Violations under the statute are restricted to activities that significantly pol-
lute, impair, or destroy the state's environment, terms not defined within
the Act.6"
Despite these broad standing provisions, the plaintiff must overcome
several procedural obstacles before he may present his case to the judici-
ary. '7 As a condition precedent to bringing suit, the citizen or entity must
send written notice of the intention to sue to the Department of Natural
Resources, Department of Environmental Management, and the Attorney
General who, in turn, must notify the appropriate state environmental
agency." The plaintiff must then wait six months for the agency to address
the problem by holding a hearing or issuing a final order." Unlike the op-
portunity to personally pursue the complaint in a court of law, the plaintiff
is merely joined in the administrative hearing. 70 Other than on appeal from
the administrative ruling,71 the plaintiff may only have standing before the
judiciary if the agency fails to hold a hearing and enter a final determina-
tion in the plaintiff's case.7 '
One of the two defenses available to a defendant under IEPA also re-
62. Note, supra note 8, at 564.
63. Sax & Connor, supra note 16, at 1080-81. See note, supra note 8, at 561.
64. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-6-1-1, 3 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987). For complete text, see
supra note 18.
65. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-6-1-5 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987).
66. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-6-1-1(a) (West 1983 & Supp. 1987); Sekerez v. U.S. Steel
Corp., 316 N.E.2d 413, 414 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974) (court noted that nowhere in the statute are
the terms pollution, impairment, or destruction defined).
67. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-6-1-1(a) (West 1983 & Supp. 1987). In Indiana, environ-
mental litigation is restricted to a limited set of circumstances - potential plaintiffs are pre-
cluded from the courts unless they fully exhaust administrative remedies. DiMento, supra note
13, at 412.
68. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-6-1-1(a) (West 1983 & Supp. 1987).
69. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-6-1-1(b) (West 1983 & Supp. 1987).
70. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-6-1-1(b) (West 1983 & Supp. 1987).
71. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-6-1-1(c) (West 1983 & Supp. 1987).
72. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-6-1-1(b) (West 1983 & Supp. 1987).
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lates to the government agency. Any defendant in compliance with an ap-
plicable administrative rule or standard for pollution control has a prima
facie defense to the plaintiffis claim." The defendant may also escape re-
sponsibility on the ground that, although there is no applicable rule, there is
no prudent or feasible alternative to his conduct and that his conduct is
consistent with the public health, safety, and welfare.7 4 This defense deters
any attempt to get effective judicial review of regulated activity adversely
affecting the environment.
B. Application of IEPA
A hypothetical situation may help illustrate the limited usefulness of
IEPA. Suppose a steel manufacturer in Gary, Indiana, is discharging chem-
icals into the atmosphere. Some residents of Gary and an environmental
group based in Valparaiso, Indiana, wish to challenge the steel mill's con-
duct under IEPA.
In order to have standing to sue, the plaintiffs must fulfill all of the
procedural prerequisites of the statute or risk dismissal of their case."5 The
plaintiffs must send written notice of their suit to the Department of Natu-
ral Resources, Department of Environmental Management, and to the At-
torney General, who will then notify the Air Pollution Control Board hav-
ing jurisdiction over the mill.7 These prerequisites are the first step in the
maze of pursuing polluters under IEPA. Furthermore, the plaintiffs must
wait six months for the agency to hold a hearing or issue a final order
regarding the factory's emissions.7 7 Importantly, the Air Pollution Control
Board must both fail to hold a hearing and issue a final order before the
Gary residents and the environmental group have standing before the
court .7 The Indiana Court of Appeals stressed that standing should be
granted only in limited circumstances.7 ' Therefore, if the Air Pollution
Control Board fulfills only one of these functions, the plaintiff will not have
access to the court. 80
Now assume that the plaintiffs have fulfilled all of the procedural pre-
requisites and that the agency has failed to both hold a hearing and to issue
a final order. The plaintiffs finally have standing. At this point, however,
the steel manufacturer may attempt to invoke the prima facie defense of
73. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-6-1-2(a)(I) (West 1983 & Supp. 1987).
74. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-6-1-2(a)(2) (West 1983 & Supp. 1987).
75. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
78. Sekerez v. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co., 166 Ind. App. 563, 337 N.E.2d 521
(1975).
79. Id. at 569, 337 N.E.2d at 525. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
80. Id.
[Vol. 22
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compliance with administrative standards."' The statute gives deference to
adminsitrative agencies and their work by providing the defendant's con-
duct with a presumption of validity through this defense. A finding that the
steel mill's level of chemical emission is within the limits set by the Air
Pollution Control Board will serve as a prima facie defense to the plaintiffs'
claim. This defense results even if the regulatory limits allow excessive
pollution.8
2
Once the defense is established, the burden shifts back to the plain-
tiffs.83 This shift leaves the plaintiffs in a difficult position since, under
IEPA, the court does not have power to review agency regulations or con-
sider their effectiveness in light of the facts of the case.84 In other words,
the plaintiffs cannot sustain their burden of proof where the defendant ac-
ted in accordance with agency rules, since the rules may not be rejected by
the court. Whether the regulations are reasonable or unreasonable, IEPA
shields from judicial scrutiny the agency standards set by the Air Pollution
Control Board or any other administrative body having jurisdiction. Dismis-
sal of their case leaves the plaintiffs with the impractical common law theo-
ries, or virtually without any means of fighting the chemicals polluting the
state's atmosphere. 85
IV. PROBLEMS WITH IEPA
IEPA is not helpful for fighting pollution for several reasons. First,
IEPA violates the objectives of SEPAs. Second, IEPA's procedural impedi-
ments curtail use of the Act, as is evident from an examination of several
SEPAs which do not possess procedural barriers. Finally, the requirement
of a high threshold of harm to sustain the burden of proof adds to the
impotency of IEPA.
A. IEPA Violates the Objectives of SEPAs
The purposes of a SEPA are to improve the quality of the environment
and increase public participation in environmental law enforcement.86 Citi-
zen initiative in the courtroom provides an essential supplement to the envi-
81. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
82. For the inability of administrative agencies to set down objective, effective environ-
mental controls, see infra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
83. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-6-1-2(b) (West 1983 & Supp. 1987). The defendant under
IEPA may rebut a showing of significant pollution, impairment, or destruction through evi-
dence of compliance with an applicable pollution standard. Abrams, supra note 21, at 125.
84. Compare with MEPA under which Michigan courts have power to reject agency
standards and even promulgate new ones. See infra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
86. DiMento, supra note 13, at 428.
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ronmental agencies' regulation and enforcement.8" Also, removing technical
standing requirements through SEPAs increases the number of potential
guardians of the environment, giving rise to greater policing of polluters."8
For several reasons, however, the Indiana statute has not served these
objectives. The legislature unnecessarily restricted the statute by requiring
a plaintiff to exhaust all administrative remedies before gaining access to
the courts.8 This inconvenience alone has been cited as one reason Indiana
citizens do not use IEPA.o0 As previously illustrated, this procedure effec-
tively precludes citizens from playing an active role in the environmental
decision-making process.91 Instead of having his complaint heard by the ju-
diciary, the statute requires that a plaintiff wait six months for an agency to
address the issue before access to the courts is available. While an agency is
considering the case, the concerned citizen is merely a passive amicus. 92 He
is denied the opportunity to initiate private litigation and fight for injunc-
tive or declaratory relief himself. Instead, environmental agencies, isolated
from citizen action and too close to those they are supposed to regulate,
handle the citizen's complaint.93 The agency might not even hold a hearing
regarding the plaintiff's grievance but may simply issue a final order.94
Thus, IEPA does not foster citizen input, despite the goal of SEPAs to
increase public participation."
In addition to the burdensome administrative requirement imposed by
the legislature, the judiciary's interpretation of the statute renders IEPA
nearly worthless. Although no legislative history is available regarding the
purpose behind the enactment of IEPA, logic insists that the legislature
intended to develop a tool for citizens to use to fight pollution, despite the
burdensome agency requirement." The very existence of IEPA indicates
87. Sax & DiMento, supra note 54, at 2.
88. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
89. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-6-1-1(a) (West 1983 & Supp. 1987). See supra note 67 and
accompanying text.
90. Shaffer, supra note 21, at 46, 48; Note, supra note 21, at 1026 n.241; DiMento,
supra note 13, at 412.
91. See notes 75-80 and accompanying text. Although many states have enacted
SEPAs, barriers in the form of restrictions and redtape remain. Kean, supra note 55, at 207.
92. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-6-1-1(b) (West 1983 & Supp. 1987).
93. See infra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
95. See DiMento, supra note 13 and accompanying text.
96. See Thompson v. Fugate, 347 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Va. 1972) (courts must construe
NEPA so as not to frustrate congressional policy of promoting efforts to eliminate damage to
the environment). See also State v. Griffin, 226 Ind. 279, 79 N.E. 537 (1948). The court is
bound by the rule that "a statute must be reasonably and fairly interpreted so as to give it
efficient operation, and to give effect . . . to the intention of the legislature. . . . It should not
be wantonly narrowed, limited or emasculated and rendered ineffective, absurd or nugatory. If
possible it should be allowed to perform its intended mission as shown by the existing evils to
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legislative desire to provide additional means of controlling pollution."7 To
presume otherwise would render IEPA an empty gesture to the public.
Also, the legislature passed IEPA only two years after NEPA 5 and at the
same time that several other states enacted their SEPAs.99 Thus, the Indi-
ana courts should construe the statute in light of the objectives of SEPAs100
without unnecessarily limiting or narrowing the statute.101
Nevertheless, the Indiana judiciary took a strict and overly cautious
approach in the one case construing IEPA.102 In addition to the administra-
tive prerequisites making standing difficult, the Indiana Court of Appeals
erected a wall around the statute making it even less amenable to public
use. The court considered the tenor of the provision as calling for a strict
construction of standing and sparing use.103 The court's comments can only
be remedied." Id. at 284, 79 N.E.2d at 540.
97. Similarly, MEPA's drafter indicates that MEPA was developed to increase private
initiative, expand judicial involvement, and restrict agency authority, all with the intention of
benefiting the environment. See Sax & Connor, supra note 16, at 1005.
98. NEPA was enacted in 1969; IEPA was enacted in 1971. Although individuals may
not invoke NEPA themselves, the statute was developed in part to present the public With
information regarding environmental consequences of agency action. See McGarity, supra
note 9, at 807.
99. MEPA was enacted in 1970. Minnesota enacted a SEPA in 1971 and New Jersey
enacted a provision in 1974. Since agencies have failed in their responsibility of protecting the
public's environmental interests, MEPA was developed to allow citizens, the logically proper
defenders of the environment, access to court to redress pollution. Citizens may finally partici-
pate. Butler & Cameron, Book Review, I ECOLOGY L.Q. 228 (1971) (reviewing Sax, DEFEND-
ING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION (1971)). See Dept. of Transp. v.
PSC Resources, Inc., 159 N.J. Super. 154, 387 A.2d 393 (1978). In this case, a property
owner invoked the New Jersey SEPA to sue a corporation operating an oil reprocessing facil-
ity. The court commented that the statute was developed for those instances where the govern-
ment agencies do not take necessary action; an individual may be assured a course of action
under the SEPA. The broad language of the Act indicates that the provision was developed to
allow individuals to supplement existing agency action. Id. at 163, 387 A.2d at 397.
100. DiMento, supra note 13, at 428 and accompanying text. See supra notes 87-88 and
accompanying text.
101. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. The courts are given the important re-
sponsibility of ensuring that SEPAs are interpreted consistently with their objectives. SEPA
"legislation is based on the premise that the courts will be more receptive to increased protec-
tion of natural resources than are administrative agencies set up to pursue that goal. To the
extent this is an accurate evaluation, [SEPAs] will provide for increased protection of the
environment." Note, Note: The Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, 56 MINN. L. REv. 575,
639 (1972).
102. Sekerez v. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co., 166 Ind. App. 563, 337 N.E.2d 521
(1975).
103. Id. at 569, 337 N.E.2d at 525. "Although IC 1971, 13-6-1-1(b) accords standing to
bring an action, it does so under limited circumstances. The general tenor of its provisions is
restrictive and an action thereunder is not permitted unless an agency fails to hold a hearing
and make a final determination." The court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint since the
agency had issued a final order, although no hearing was ever held. "There has been no show-
ing in the case at bar that the agency refused to proceed. . . . [I]t must be concluded that
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be interpreted as an effort to deter use of the statute, contrary to what the
legislature must have intended when enacting IEPA. Consequently, the
SEPA objective of improving the environment through the citizenry is vio-
lated and legislative will is frustrated.
The Indiana Supreme Court is apparently critical of citizen standing
provisions generally. In response to another public lawsuit statute,'0 the
court commented on the alleged dangers of granting standing to an individ-
ual without legal injury-in-fact. The court stressed that Machiavellians liv-
ing in Utopian communities would enlist such statutes while pretending to
sue on behalf of the public.108 According to the court, such liberal statutes
allow those with pure hearts and empty heads to bring frivolous lawsuits.'"
The Indiana Court of Appeals apparently shares this attitude, as it insisted
that standing under IEPA is only to be granted in very limited circum-
stances,10 7 in spite of legislative intent to the contrary.
The Indiana Court of Appeals' view is erroneous, however, and should
be reconsidered in light of the legislature's March 6, 1971, amendment to
the statuteos and other state's experiences with SEPAs. Recognizing the
dangers of Machiavellian br frivolous claims, the Indiana legislature pro-
tected the courts through the addition of qualifying language to the stat-
ute.10 9 The words "significant" and "significantly" were inserted in several
sentences to describe the type of pollution and kinds of activities constitut-
ing violations under the statute.11  Courts in other jurisdictions interpret
similar language as precluding unwarranted litigation.' Any additional re-
strictions on standing out of fear of abuse of the Act are unnecessary.
Instead of fulfilling its objective of allowing more individuals a chance
to police the environment, unnecessary restrictions and negative attitudes
toward IEPA have destroyed any meaningful use of the Act. As evidenced
by the statute's meager record,1 2 the absence of opportunity for public and
judicial involvement renders this tool intended for pollution control
appellant therefore lacked the necessary standing to bring the present action." Id.
104. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-17-1 (West 1983) (a citizens' suit statute for testing public
improvements).
105. Sekerez v. Lake Superior Ct., 263 Ind. 601, 603, 335 N.E.2d 199, 200 (1975).
106. Id.
107. Youngstown, 166 Ind. App. at 569, 337 N.E.2d at 525.
108. CONF. COMM. REPORT, S. No. 345, Apr. 6, 1971.
109. Id.
110. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-6-1-1(a) (West 1983 & Supp. 1987) (line 9: "significant");
IND. CODE ANN. § 13-6-1-1(d) (West 1983 & Supp. 1987) (line 8: "significantly"); IND.
CODE ANN. § 13-6-1-1(e) (West 1983 & Supp. 1987) (line 2: "significant"); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 13-6-1-1(f) (West 1983 & Supp. 1987) (line 4: "significantly").
I l1. See infra notes 225-30 and accompanying text. SEPAs have not led to a flood of
frivolous suits in these states.
112. See supra note 19.
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unusable and illusory. The future of IEPA for fighting pollution is dim
indeed.
B. Unnecessary Procedural Impediments in IEPA
The burdensome requirement of exhausting agency remedies and the
apparent unwillingness of the judiciary to broadly interpret standing have
destroyed effective use of IEPA. To test the validity of this hesitant ap-
proach toward judicial and public involvement, examination of the Michi-
gan Environmental Protection Act (MEPA), 113 the leading SEPA in the
113. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 691.1201-.1205 (West 1987) provides:
Sec. I. This act, shall be known and may be cited as the "Thomas J. Anderson,
Gordon Rockwell environmental protection act of 1970."
Sec. 2. (I) The attorney general, any political subdivision of the state, any instru-
mentality or agency of the state or of a political subdivision thereof, any person, partner-
ship, corporation, association, organization or other legal entity may maintain an action
in the circuit court having jurisdiction where the alleged violation occurred or is likely to
occur for declaratory and equitable relief against the state, any political subdivision
thereof, any person, partnership, corporation, association, organization or other legal en-
tity for the protection of the air, water, and other natural resources and the public trust
therein from pollution, impairment, or destruction.
(2) In granting relief provided by subsection (I) where there is involved a
standard for pollution or for an anti-pollution device or procedure, fixed by rule or other-
wise, by an instrumentality or agency of the state or a political subdivision thereof, the
court may:
(a) Determine the validity, applicability and reasonableness of the standard.
(b) When a court finds a standard to [sic] deficient, direct the adoption of a stan-
dard approved and specified by the court.
Sec. 3. (I) When the plaintiff in the action has made a prima facie showing that
the conduct of the defendant has, or is likely to pollute, impair or destroy the air, water,
or other natural resources or the public trust therein, the defendant may rebut the prima
facie showing by the submission of evidence to the contrary. The defendant may also
show, by way of an affirmative defense, that there is no feasible and prudent alternative
to defendant's conduct and that such conduct is consistent with the promotion of the
public health, safety and welfare in light of the state's paramount concern for the protec-
tion of its natural resources from pollution, impairment or destruction. Except as to the
affirmative defense, the principles of burden of proof and weight of the evidence generally
applicable in civil actions in the circuit courts shall apply to actions brought under this
act.
(2) The court may appoint a master or referee, who shall be a disinterested
person and technically qualified to take testimony and make a record and a report of his
findings to the court in the action.
(3) Costs may be apportioned to the parties if the interests of justice
require.
Sec. 4. (I) The court may grant temporary and permanent equitable relief, or may
impose conditions on the defendant that are required to protect the air, water and other
natural resources or the public trust therein from pollution, impairment or destruction.
(2) If administrative, licensing or other proceedings are required or availa-
ble to determine the legality of the defendant's conduct, the court may remit the parties
to such proceedings, which proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with and subject
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nation,"" is instructive. Unlike IEPA, MEPA essentially shifts environmen-
tal decision-making power from the agencies to the courtroom, since there
is no prerequisite of exhausting administrative remedies. " 5 Further, the
Michigan courts have been open to suits brought under MEPA. e16 Conse-
quently, the judiciary and public play a leading role under MEPA and this
joint involvement has had positive effects.' 1 7
1. Judicial Involvement
The Michigan courts' more active role has several advantages. First,
standing before the judiciary without prior administrative intervention in
the case avoids the politically-biased forum of the administrative agency.
Environmental agencies are permeated with political pressures from busi-
to the provisions of Act No. 306 of the Public Acts of 1969, being sections 24.201 to
24.313 of the Compiled Laws of 1948. In so remitting the court may grant temporary
equitable relief where necessary for the protection of the air, water and other natural
resources or the public trust therein from pollution, impairment or destruction. In so
remitting the court shall retain jurisdiction of the action pending completion thereof for
the purpose of determining whether adequate protection from pollution, impairment or
destruction has been afforded.
(3). Upon completion of such proceedings, the court shall adjudicate the
impact of the defendant's conduct on the air, water or other natural resources and on the
public trust therein in accordance with this act. In such adjudication the court may order
that additional evidence be taken to the extent necessary to protect the rights recognized
in this act.
(4) Where, as to any administrative, licensing or other proceeding, judicial
review thereof is available, notwithstanding the provision to the contrary of Act No. 306
of the Public Acts of 1969, pertaining to judicial review, the court originally taking juris-
diction shall maintain jurisdiction for purposes of judicial review.
Sec. 5. (I) Whenever administrative, licensing or other proceedings, and judicial
review thereof are available by law, the agency or the court may permit the attorney
general, any political subdivision of the state, any instrumentality or agency of the state
or of a political subdivision thereof, any person, partnership, corporation, association, or-
ganization or other legal entity to intervene as a party on the filing of a pleading asserting
that the proceeding or action for judicial review involves conduct which has, or which is
likely to have, the effect of polluting, impairing or destroying the air, water or other
natural resources or the public trust ti-erein.
(2) In any such administrative, licensing or other proceedings, and any ju-
dicial review thereof, any alleged pollution, impairment or destruction of the air, water or
other natural resources or the public trust therein, shall be determined, and no conduct
shall be authorized or approved which does, or is likely to have such effect so long as
there is a feasible and prudent alternative consistent with the reasonable requirements of
the public health, safety and welfare.
(3) The doctrine of collateral estoppel and res judicata may be applied by
the court to prevent multiplicity of suits.
114. See supra note 23.
115. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1202(l) (West 1987).
116. See infra notes 125-31 and 141-51 and accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 118-22 and 125-37 and accompanying text.
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ness and industry, entities that they regulate. "' Unlike the typical environ-
mental plaintiff who has limited resources, big business typically possesses
considerable financial resources enabling it to exert pressure on the regula-
tory agencies to consider its interests above those of the less powerful envi-
ronmentalists." 9 Thus, the agencies frequently fail to consider the public
interest. 20
Unlike the Indiana environmental plaintiff who is immediately sub-
jected to this potential bureaucratic bias, the Michigan plaintiff may pre-
sent his case to an essentially neutral tribunal, the judiciary. Compared to
an agency, the court has less interaction with regulated defendants brought
before it and is less subject to outside political pressures. 2 ' Shifting envi-
118. Former Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall summarizes forces which foul ad-
ministrative machinery, and thus diminish bureaucratic efficiency, as follows:
[A] government agency ... is an empire of many interests. As Secretary .. . I was
constantly called upon to call balls and strikes between competing interests within the
agency. . . .For example . . . the needs of the budget for the money from oil lease sale
tugs against environmental programs, and so it goes. Every administrator will seek to
compromise the competing demands within his agency. It becomes a way of life. . . .It
is sometimes easier for a court to avoid compromise.
* ' ' [E]very agency develops a program ...and a point of view. Blind spots also
develop. The administrator may conclude that one type of pollution is the important thing
and . . . leave other problems to another day. . . . In addition, the administrator often
hears about problems over and over again, and he becomes jaded. A problem may be so
pervasive that he does not get upset with each new example and begins to lose any sense
of urgency. When an aroused citizen or conservation group goes to a judge, he will not
face the bureaucrat who has heard it all before.
When an agency takes vigorous action against pollution, there is likely to be a vigor-
ous counterattack by large economic interests. Things slow down, drag out, and, in many
cases, become interminable.
* * * [Algencies and the industries they regulate often begin to think alike and de-
velop their own modus vivendi. They learn to accommodate each other. Today we need
action, not accommodation.
Hearings on S. 3575 Before the Subcomm. on Energy, Natural Resources, and the Environ-
ment of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1970). "'Even if an agency
is diligently attempting to enforce its statutory mandate, the sordid realities of bureaucratic
survival in a highly political atmosphere force it to compromise environmental values to an
unacceptable degree." Cramton, Citizen Suits in the Environmental Field, 25 AD. L. REV.
147, 148 (1973).
119. Plaintiffs are usually limited in their ability to finance EPA suits and almost always
face defendants with greater resources. For this reason, Sax opposed procedural prerequisites
to MEPA as they make litigation more expensive and deny most local groups a day in court.
Sax & DiMento, supra note 54, at 5. See Note, supra note 8, at 570.
120. The spectre of pollution haunting the United States stems from obeisance paid to
the sacred administrative cow. As a consequence of the power within the fossilized bureaucra-
cies, the public voice is ignored and persons are ordinarily left without recourse. Forkosh,
Administrative Conduct in Environmental Areas - A Suggested Degree of Public Control, 12
S. TEX. L.J. I, 1-2 (1970).
121. Courts can operate with less pressure from industrial and business groups than leg-
islators and agencies. Hatch, supra note 4, at 124.. Unlike agencies, which are highly
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ronmental controversies from the agency to the courtroom thus places the
environmental plaintiff and regulated defendant on equal footing. 2
In the unlikely event that a plaintiff using IEPA is granted standing,
he must still overcome the statutory defense of compliance with an adminis-
trative standard, a second obstacle tied to the politically-biased administra-
tive agency.123 If the defendant is indeed complying with pollution control
regulations, he is presumptively not liable, regardless of the effectiveness of
the standards.12 4 IEPA does not give the court the power to evaluate and
reject regulations, even when they are ineffective for protection of the envi-
ronment. The agency standards are essentially shielded from judicial scru-
tiny; the court may not check the agency's power.
In contrast, the Michigan judiciary has the responsibility of assuring
that the agencies make the best possible decisions regarding environmental
quality. MEPA accomplishes this check on agency power by providing the
courts with de novo review of agency regulations and findings.1 25 To achieve
more effective protection of the environment, the purpose of MEPA and all
SEPAs, the Michigan legislature believed that agencies could not be ex-
empt from strict judicial scrutiny.' 26 The courts' power to review, reject,
and reform agency regulations was thus considered necessary to assure that
agencies set sufficient standards to protect the public domain. 2 Indeed
MEPA goes further, since the court may even promulgate new regulations
politicized, courts are relatively apolitical. They do not interact daily with regulated defend-
ants. DiMento, supra note II, at 420.
122. "Moving adjudication of environmental controversies from the agencies to the
courts is thus seen as a means of allowing the citizen to be heard by government on an equal
basis with the regulated interest group." DiMento, supra note 11, at 420. The agencies are
often unresponsive to private litigants. MEPA, however, by providing direct court access, has
given the private litigant hope in solving the administrative problem that has bogged down
local, state; and federal governments for a decade. Hatch, supra note 4, at 124-25.
123. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-6-1-2(a)(1) (West 1983 & Supp. 1987). See supra notes
118-20 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
125. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1201(2)(a)(b) (West 1987).
126. See West Mich. Envtl. Action Council v. Natural Resources Comm'n, 405 Mich.
741, 275 N.W.2d 538 (1979). The supreme court reversed a decision in which the trial court
had deferred to the Department of Natural Resources' conclusion that no damage to a forest
would take place as a result of allowing an oil company to drill in it. The court ruled that "the
EPA would not accomplish its purpose if courts were to exempt administrative agencies from
the strict scrutiny which effective protection of the environment demands." Id. at 754, 275
N.W.2d at 542.
127. Under MEPA, "courts may inquire directly into the merits of environmental con-
troversies, rather than concern themselves merely with reforming procedures or with invalidat-
ing arbitrary and capricious conduct." Id. This forces agencies to pursue their responsibilities
effectively since they must defend themselves in court when charged with failure to protect the
environment.
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to replace regulations established by administrative agencies.2 8
In contrast to IEPA, which restricts judicial involvement and favors
administrative control, judicial input is given credit for several of the unex-
pected, yet very positive, developments in the Michigan environmental pro-
tection effort. The prospect of judicial scrutiny has been cited as creating an
incentive for defendant polluters and administrative agencies to more dili-
gently pursue environmental protection where less cooperation was previ-
ously exhibited.2 9 Although Michigan has not experienced any major
change in the pattern of commercial development, several authorities have
noted that in general developers are exercising more caution in a variety of
matters including sewage disposal, erosion control, and provision of access
roads. 130 Also, the threat of judicial examination under MEPA spurred an
increase in administrative efforts. This was the intention of MEPA's drafter
who believed that for the Act to be successful, it must motivate entrepre-
neurs and agencies to do their jobs more conscientiously. 3 '
128. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 681.1201(2)(b) (West 1987).
129. See Three Lakes Ass'n v. Fisher, No. 1142 (Antrim County Cir. Ct., Consent
Judgment, Aug. 20, 1973), cited in Sax & DiMento, supra note 54, at 10 n.34. Defendant
planned to develop lake front property. Plaintiffs sued under MEPA arguing that the develop-
ment would result in overcrowding and pollution of the lake. Before the case went to trial,
defendant conceded to drastic changes in his plans to accommodate plaintiffs. See also Irish v.
Property Dev. Group, Inc., No. 234-3 (Antrim County Cir. Ct., Decision, Mar. 5, 1973), cited
in Sax & DiMento, supra note 54, at 10 n.38. Defendant developers agreed in course of
MEPA trial to make mitigating promises that very likely would not have been made volunta-
rily or in the less intense atmosphere of administrative hearings. The court retained jurisdic-
tion of development to ensure compliance with the changes. Id.
130. Sax & DiMento, supra note 54, at 12.
131. Sax & Connor, supra note 16, at 1050.
[W]ary of a public lawsuit, members of Livingston County's Dept. of Public Works may
set up a close monitoring system on water quality at Thompson Lake ...
. . . DPW members have taken careful note of a recent ruling by the Livingston
County Circuit Court ...
They are reasonably certain the Red Oaks Plant can meet most of the purity stan-
dards Judge Paul R. Mahinske imposed ...
If the question of pollution by the Red Oaks plant [sic] is ever raised in court . . .
DPW members want to have statistics which can point the blame at some other source.
State Journal (Lansing), Apr. 5, 1972, at B-5, col. 5, quoted in Sax & Connor, supra note 16,
at 1050 n.181. See Muha v. Union Lakes Associates, No. 2964 (Grand Traverse County Cir.
Ct., filed Aug. 14, 1972), discussed in Sax & DiMento, supra note 54, at 12 n.45 (Defendants
were constructing a shopping center and parking lot on low-lying land near a stream. Only
after several citizens filed a complaint under MEPA did the DNR take initiative to force the
defendant to clear pollution from his project from the creek), cited in Sax & DiMento, supra
note 54, at 12 n.46. Controversial plans to build a harbor at the mouth of the Platte River also
brought about a change in typical administrative behavior. The DNR supported the project
and ignored the conservationists opposing it until plans were made to file suit under MEPA.
According to newspaper coverage, the anticipated suit under MEPA helped persuade the
DNR to reconsider and abandon its plan. Ann Arbor News, Feb. 27, 1972, at 35, col. 6, cited
in Sax & Connor, supra note 16, at 1052 n.188.
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When enacting IEPA, the Indiana legislature was apparently very sen-
sitive to the proper respect and regard for agency expertise.1 3 2 Indeed, the
Michigan administrative agencies themselves reacted negatively to the idea
of judicial review and examination of their standards. In Michigan, defend-
ants argued on behalf of the agencies that MEPA improperly disregards the
agency role.13 3 Nevertheless, such judicial review has resulted in a cleaner
environment where agency control proved insufficient. 34
Like the Indiana statute, MEPA also provides standing for agencies to
sue under the Act. 13 5 Unlike the Indiana experience, however, Michigan
agencies are actually using the provision and contributing to a very signifi-
cant aspect of the statute's success. Several agencies, after suffering
through judicial scrutiny of their work, are now comfortable invoking the
statute as plaintiffs to help fulfill their function of protecting the environ-
ment.' The agencies have forced polluters to comply with improvements in
their pollution control procedures.1 3 7
Also, responses to a questionnaire sent to several attorneys handling MEPA issues support
increased administrative efforts. One plaintiff's attorney responded: "My case involved the
W.R.C. [Water Resources Commission] standards and witnesses. . . . I think that this [judi-
cial scrutiny] heightened their concern for their own standards and procedures. Having them
called into question . . . seemed to sting.", cited in Sax & Connor, supra note 16, at 1053.
One Assistant Attorney General made the following comment regarding EPA cases he
had handled: "In my view, . . . pending litigation has materially affected [agency] attitudes
toward environmental issues . .. [Algencies have tightened up their procedures for handling
of contaminating wastes." Id.
132. This is demonstrated by the requirement that a plaintiff must first give an agency
six months to resolve the issue before a court has jurisdictioon over the matter. IND. CODE
ANN. § 13-6-1-1(b) (West 1983 & Supp. 1987).
133. See Kelly v. National Gypsum Co., No. 1918 (Alpena County Cir. Ct., Consent
Judgment, Sept. 25, 1973). Defendants argued that ignoring determinations of their Air Pollu-
tion Control Commission was improper disregard of agency expertise. Nevertheless, the Attor-
ney General, who initiated the suit on behalf of the public, argued for judicial review of stan-
dards set by the commission. "We have asked the courts to take action against a firm which,
while in compliance with an order of the Air Pollution Control Commission, is still polluting
the air around it. We have taken this action because we consider the Commission's order
inadequate," quoted in Sax & DiMento, supra note 54, at 26.
134. See supra notes 129-31 and 133 and accompanying text.
135. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1202(I) (West 1987).
136. The Air Pollution Control Division of the Wayne County Health Department, for
example, incorporates the statute into daily policing activities. The Department, having juris-
diction over Detroit, has enlisted the statute in suits leading to consent orders with Chrysler,
Ford, the Detroit Edison Company, and the American Cement Corporation. See Wayne
County Health Dept. (WCHD) v. Chrysler Corp., No. 166223 (Wayne County Cir. Ct., filed
Oct. I, 1970); WCHD v. Ford Motor Co., No. 211654-R (Wayne County Cir. Ct., filed July
5, 1972); WCHD v. Detroit Edison Co., No. 248582 (Wayne County Cir. Ct., filed Aug. 31,
1973); WCHD v. American Cement Corp., No. 194927-R (Wayne County Cir. Ct., Dec. 29,
1971), cited in DiMento, supra note I], at 432 n.8.
137. DiMento, supra note 11, at 445.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 22, No. 1 [1987], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol22/iss1/5
1987] INDIANA ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 175
2. Citizen Involvement
As a result of denying the courts any significant control over environ-
mental issues, IEPA also effectively denies public participation in the cru-
sade against environmental degradation. When remanded to the adminis-
trative agency where the case may sit for six months, the individual is
relegated to the role of powerless observer.' The agency cannot possibly
have as vigorous an interest in fighting for the environment as the plaintiff
who spends his time and money to personally initiate the litigation.139 Forc-
ing environmentally-concerned plaintiffs to wait for a politically-influenced
agency to handle their cases is an inconvenience and a disincentive for indi-
viduals to take action to improve their environment.'" By keeping the
plaintiff out of the courtroom and removing the case from his control, IEPA
destroys important practical and personal aspects of SEPAs. Consequently,
citizens are reluctant to invoke the statute as is evident from the scarce use
of IEPA. 11" The objective of increasing citizen action in environmental law
enforcement is lost. Indiana's environment is the ultimate loser.
In contrast to IEPA, MEPA as well as the Connecticut Environmental
Protection Act (CEPA) grant the citizen initial standing in a court of
law.'43 Liberal citizen standing has benefited the Michigan and Connecticut
environments in several ways. First, administrative agencies frequently lack
the time, data, personnel, or money required for enforcement action. An
agency might rank a matter as particularly insignificant and pursue the
issue less vigorously than it should, or fail to pursue the matter at all. 1 3
Thus, a statute that provides citizens with authority to bring alleged pol-
luters before the judiciary supplements the limited resources of the
agencies. ,
138. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-6-1-1(b) (West 1983 & Supp. 1987).
139. Citizens may participate more directly in the process of protecting their interests
in courts than in agency proceedings, and have greater leverage there. Issues are nar-
rowed from the general to the specific in litigation, and positions become a matter of open
record.
. . . [F]urther, without court action and its attendant publicity, legislatures and the
public may never become aware of important issues and of administrative decisions hav-
ing environmental impact.
Butler & Cameron, supra note 99, at 229-30.
140. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
141. "The citizen who today sees his Nation being ravaged also sees a labyrinth of agen-
cies, procedures, and rules which make individual action impossible." Note, supra note 8, at
564 n.9.
142. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1202 (West 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
22a-16 (West 1985).
143. See McGregor, supra note 57, at 621.
144. "Society is in no position to refuse pollution monitoring and enforcement by so
widely distributed and resourceful a staff as its own citizenry." Id.
Rhoades: The Indiana Environmental Protection Act:  An Environmental Weapo
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1987
176 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22
The Supreme Court of Connecticut characterized the public right to
take polluters to court as one of private Attorneys General empowered to
vindicate the public interest.' 45 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Michigan
described the broad rights conferred on individuals under MEPA as an ef-
fective means of augmenting the public agencies which have not proved to
be dedicated defenders of the environment. 46 Instead of depending on the
limited resources of an agency, MEPA and CEPA provide the ordinary citi-
zen with standing, consequently greatly increasing the policing of the
environment.
Additionally, by letting administrative agencies handle citizens' com-
plaints, IEPA removes responsibility for environmental protection from the
public. Those aware of, concerned about, and affected by the environment
are not entrusted with its well-being. Citizens have no incentive to bring
suits under the statute because the power remains in the agencies.1
47
MEPA, in contrast, places responsibility for the environment where it
should be - with the people.'48 The Supreme Court of Michigan credits
MEPA as providing "a sizeable share of the initiative for environmental
law enforcement for that segment of society most directly affected - the
public. " 149 Environmentalists supporting MEPA argued that greater citizen
participation was necessary before any environmental improvement could
145. Town of Greenwich v. Conn. Transp. Auth., 166 Conn. 337, 348 A.2d 596 (1974).
The court stated:
We are of the opinion, ... that [CEPA] is an example of a legislative enactment of
what has been described as the expanding doctrine of 'private attorney[s generals', [sic]
who are empowered to institute proceedings to vindicate the public interest. . . . By
utilizing this procedure, the legislature expanded the number of potential guardians of
the public interest in the environment into the millions, instead of relying exclusively on
the limited resources of a particular agency.
Id. at 343, 348 A.2d at 599.
146. Daniels v. Allen Indus., 391 Mich. 398, 216 N.W.2d 762 (1974). This was a class
action suit in which plaintiffs sought discovery of pollution control studies conducted by the
defendant. The court ruled for the plaintiffs, partially on grounds of the policy behind MEPA.
"[Tlhe Legislature in enacting the Environmental Protection Act has made a realistic policy
decision that the stimulus of possible litigation is now practically necessary to expedite what
the ideal of laissez-faire has been too slow in accomplishing." Id. at 410-1I, 216 N.W.2d at
768.
147. While governmental power expands, individual participation contracts; the individ-
ual citizen feels excluded from government. This feeling of helplessness and exclusion is an
evil. Individuals and organized groups are a source of information, experience, and wisdom
which the agencies are not accepting. Because the agencies are captured by particular pres-
sures often not in the public interest, procedural devices enabling citizens to invoke judicial
control are very valuable. See Jaffe, The Citizen As Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-
Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033 (1968).
148. Daniels, 391 Mich. at 411, 216 N.W.2d at 768 n.6 (court described MEPA as a
significant affirmation of confidence in the citizen).
149. Ray v. Mason County Drain Comm'r, 393 Mich. 294, 305, 224 N.W.2d 883, 887-
88 (1975).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 22, No. 1 [1987], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol22/iss1/5
1987] INDIANA ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 177
be achieved.' 50 This objective is being reached by permitting individuals, as
well as agencies, to force polluters to bear the consequences of their con-
duct.' 5' In contrast to IEPA, MEPA does what it was intended to do -
serve the public interest. In a Michigan case in which the Department of
Natural Resources (DNR) was made a defendant, the director of the DNR
stated that the suit exhibited public interest in the environment." 2 He de-
scribed MEPA as landmark legislation finally allowing concerned citizens
to register their complaints in court. Thus even as a defendant, the DNR
characterized MEPA litigation as a means of hearing and better interpret-
ing the wishes of the public.'58
Citizen aid in enforcing the law adds a healthy, fresh dimension to
state and local abatement efforts. Unfortunately, monitoring and enforce-
ment by Indiana's most resourceful staff, its citizenry, is impossible under
IEPA. Without a meaningful day in court, the public interest to be served
under IEPA is lost among the labyrinth of agencies, procedures, and rules.
C. The Burden of Proof in IEPA
In order to use IEPA, a plaintiff must establish that a defendant's con-
duct is "significantly" polluting or destroying the environment."' There has
been no judicial construction of these terms to indicate the threshold of
harm or burden of proof a plaintiff must sustain. However, at least one
commentator has noted that, consistent with the Indiana Court of Appeals'
strict interpretation of the statute and the Indiana Supreme Court's sensi-
tivity to "Machiavellian" suits, the Indiana judiciary is likely to adopt a
strict interpretation of "significant," thereby forcing a plaintiff to sustain a
150. DiMento, supra note II, at 418. See Arnstein, A Ladder of Citizen Participation,
35 J. AM. INST. OF PLANNERS 216 (1969). The author analyzes different degrees of participa-
tion in the environmental movement. The lowest rungs of involvement are advisory and non-
participatory. The highest rung of citizen control is analogous to policymaking and the power
to initiate litigation.
151. See supra notes 135-37 and 142-44 and accompanying text.
152. See infra note 153.
153. The director of the DNR commented on MEPA as follows:
It is true that the Natural Resources Commission, upon my recommendation, approved
construction. . . . It is likewise true that suit has been brought under the Environmental
Protection Act by persons who disagree with that decision. The Act - one of the
landmark pieces of environmental legislation in the nation - was passed for precisely
that reason; to allow dissenting citizens an opportunity to register their dissents in court.
Even though we have been made the defendants in this suit, we welcome it as an expres-
sion of public interest in the environment, and another step toward redefining the law so
that we can better interpret the wishes of the people.
Letter from Ralph A. MacMullen, Director, Michigan Department of Natural Resources, to
the Editor, State Journal (Lansing), Jan. 28, 1972, at A-6, col. 6, cited in Sax & Connor,
supra note 16, at 1004.
154. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-6-1-1(a) (West 1983 & Supp. 1987).
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high threshold of harm. 55
Examination of the burden of proof construed under other SEPAs
demonstrates the limiting effect of a high threshold of harm.1 56 For in-
stance, the South Dakota judiciary has interpreted the South Dakota
SEPA1 5 7 to impose a high threshold of harm. Not surprisingly, the statute
has hardly been used and all decisions have held against plaintiffs.158 The
Supreme Court of South Dakota has stressed that plaintiffs must show sub-
stantial evidence of pollution. Small-scale damage is insufficient to sustain
the burden of proof,159 yet localized environmental damage is the intended
primary focus of SEPAs.160
Similarly, the New Jersey Environmental Rights Act provides relief
from any "actual" pollution or impairment of the environment. 61 An ear-
lier version would have provided relief from activity "likely" to pollute.' 62
Although some relief has been granted under this Act, the New Jersey
courts have given a rather restrictive meaning to the burden of proof.168 In
155. Although there has been no judicial construction of the term "'significant," Youngs-
town shows an inclination to interpret the Act restrictively. Abrams, supra note 21, at 125.
156. Although these cases may be read as calling for more certain proof of harm, the
more convincing view is that plaintiffs must present evidence to satisfy a more difficult burden
of proof. Abrams, supra note 21, at 124.
157. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 34A-10-1 to -15 (1986).
158. Only three cases have been reported under the South Dakota SEPA. See In re
Solid Waste Disposal Permit Application by City of Sioux Falls, 368 N.W.2d 599 (S.D. 1978)
(plaintiffs failed to sustain burden of showing that a solid waste disposal facility would be
likely to pollute and that there was a prudent and feasible alternative to the facility); In re
Solid Waste Disposal Permit Application of County of Clay and City of Vermillion, 295
N.W.2d 328 (S.D. 1980) (plaintiffs failed in their burden of showing that pollution would
occur as a result of issuance of a waste disposal permit). But see Basis Electric Power Coop. v.
Payne, 298 N.W.2d 385 (S.D. 1980) (dismissed on grounds unrelated to the burden of proof).
159. City of Vermillion, 295 N.W.2d at 330-32. The plaintiffs contended that the city's
plans for a landfill would pollute the air, soil, and other natural resources. They argued that
the landfill would disturb the tranquility of rural homes, increase traffic on roads near the
dump, and severely decrease property values. These disturbances were not enough to violate
the Act; the court allowed the city to proceed. Id.
160. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
161. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:35A-l to -14 (Supp. 1986).
162. Abrams, supra note 21, at 125 n.136.
163. See Dept. of Transp. v. PSC Resources, Inc., 159 N.J. Super. 154, 387 A.2d 393
(1978). Broad construction was anticipated for the statute. "In those instances where govern-
ment is unable or unwilling to take the necessary action, any person should be assured of an
alternative course of action." (Sponsor's Statement to Assembly Bill 1245 which became the
New Jersey SEPA). "The broad language of the Act . . . indicate[s] that actions by 'any
person' were intended to be supplemental to actions by state agencies. . . . [T]he Environmen-
tal Rights Act broadly expands the right to enforce .. " Id. at 163, 387 A.2d at 397. Unfor-
tunately, the statute has not been interpreted as broadly as anticipated. The courts may have
been responding to the insertion of the word "actual" to describe pollution instead of an earlier
version which provided relief from activity "likely" to pollute. Goldshore, A Thumbnail Sketch
of the Environmental Rights Act, 1985 N.J. STATE B.J. I, 18.
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at least one case, the court has refused to allow environmental concerns to
interfere with a public project involving widening a highway.1 6 4
In contrast, MEPA and the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act
(MERA)"' operate with a relatively low threshold of harm.166 Consistent
with one purpose behind having a SEPA, MEPA and MERA serve as vehi-
cles for addressing relatively small, local environmental issues. These issues
are similar to those dismissed by the courts under the more restrictive
SEPAs discussed above.'6 7 Under the high threshold of harm that the Indi-
ana courts will predictably demand under IEPA, many of these issues also
would be dismissed under the Indiana Act.
MEPA sets forth no explicit threshold of harm. Instead, the Act allows
virtually anyone to sue to protect the environment from "pollution, impair-
ment, or destruction," terms not defined within the statute.168 Because of
the absence of restrictive language and the judiciary's reluctance to read a
threshold into the statute, MEPA provides an opportunity for the private
sector to bring cases concerning local environmental impact before the judi-
ciary. '6 The Michigan courts facilitate the plaintiff's efforts to establish a
prima facie case by enforcing a low threshold of harm, 70 an appropriate
gesture in light of the lack of other useful legal theories available to the
private environmental plaintiff.' Despite the Michigan Supreme Court's
164. Borough of Kenilworth v. Dept. of Transp. 151 N.J. Super. 322, 376 A.2d 1266
(1977). The plaintiff produced evidence to show that widening a highway, which required de-
stroying a lot of trees, could cause an increase in noise and air pollution, and the increased flow
of water would result in drainage problems. The plaintiffs also adduced evidence that the city's
plan failed to include reasonable methods to control rodents and other pests, which would lead
to a health hazard. The court ruled that the threat to the environment was not sufficient to
warrant judicial intervention with "this important public project." Furthermore, the plans for
the state highway were classified by the Federal Highway Administration as "non-major" fed-
eral action. Therefore, in addition to the citizen suit Act, NEPA did not reach the conduct. Id.
at 326-35, 376 A.2d at 1269-73.
165. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 116B.01-.13 (West 1987).
166. See infra notes 168-82 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
168. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1202 (West 1987).
169. MEPA applies to even the smallest instances of environmental harm. The statute's
lack of a threshold provision'enables the court to regulate a broad range of existing and poten-
tial damage. Abrams, supra note 21, at 108-09. This is consistent with the intended purposes
of SEPAs. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
170. See Anderson v. Michigan State Highways Comm'n, No. 15609-C (lngham
County Cir. Ct., filed May 8, 1973) (MEPA used to challenge redesign of an intersection near
Michigan State University); Wilcox v. Board of Comm'rs, No. 7-237 (Calhoun County Cir.
Ct., filed June 16, 1971) (MEPA used to enjoin proposed tree cutting along short stretch of
road); Tri-Cities Environmental Action Council v. A. Reenders and Sons, Inc., No. 2737 (Ot-
tawa County Cir. Ct., filed May 6, 1974) (MEPA enlisted to challenge a highway routing
plan), discussed in DiMento, supra note 1I, at 429-30.
171. See supra notes 29-53 and accompanying text.
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opportunities to establish a high threshold of harm, the court has followed
the intended use of SEPAs and has declined to do so, thereby preserving
the broad applicability and flexibility of the Act. 7 2 The Michigan Supreme
Court has considered both the destruction of a small swamp with rare eco-
logical traits 73 and the pollution of a private individual's property from a
large sewer route7 4 as significant enough to be raised under MEPA.
MERA defines environmental damage in a manner apparently impos-
ing a higher threshold of harm than MEPA.17 5 In practice, however, the
courts have required the plaintiffs to prove only a low threshold.' 7 6 MERA
requires the plaintiff to make a prima facie showing that the defendant's
conduct violates or is likely to violate an existing environmental regulation
or is activity that materially, adversely affects or is likely to materially,
adversely affect the environment. 17 7 The burden of proof has been inter-
preted leniently, which is consistent with the goal of SEPAs to provide an
adequate, usable, civil remedy to protect the state's natural resources.17 8
Although the Minnesota courts have not explicitly addressed the
threshold of harm issue, case law reveals that similar to MEPA, small-scale
local grievances receive attention under the statute.17 9 In one case a farmer
172. For instance, the supreme court could have defined a threshold of harm in Ray v.
Mason County Drain Comm'r, 393 Mich. 294, 224 N.W.2d 883 (1975). Instead, the court
ruled that evidence showing threats to a unique forest met the burden of proof. The court
addressed MEPAs broad language and lack of an explicit threshold. "ITihe Legislature spoke
as precisely as the subject matter permits and in its wisdom left to the courts the important
task of giving substance to the standard by developing a common law of environmental qual-
ity." Ray, 393 Mich. at 306, 224 N.W.2d at 888. See West Mich. Envtl. Action Council
(WMEAC) v. Natural Resources Comm'n, 405 Mich. 741, 275 N.W.2d 538 (1979) (evidence
of potential interference with elk breeding habits, from noise, odors, and traffic on access roads
due to an oil drilling project supported plaintiff's burden of proof. Again, the court offered no
definitions of what constitutes pollution or impairment).
173. See Michigan State Highway Comm'n v. Vanderkioot, 392 Mich. 159, 220
N.W.2d 416 (1974).
174. Eyde v. State, 393 Mich. 453, 225 N.W.2d I (1975). Reversing the trial court, the
court of appeals stated: "We perceive no purpose to be served by writing extensively in this
case. It is patently a dilatory effort to forestall construction of a necessary sewer, delayed by
litigation for over three years." The supreme court reversed the court of appeals, placing more
emphasis on the importance of considering the environmental damage under MEPA: "This
action raises environmental issues . . . which are of interest and concern .... .. The court
issued an injunction against the proposed construction of the sewer. Id. at 455, 225 N.W.2d at
2-3.
175. MERA defines pollution as only that conduct having a material, adverse effect on
the environment.
176. "Plaintiffs under MERA typically have not found it difficult to make a prima facie
showing of environmental damage." Abrams, supra note 21, at 122. See infra notes 179-82
and accompanying text.
177. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.02(5) (West 1987).
178. See Note, supra note 8, at 598.
179. The Minnesota courts stress substance rather than thresholds in MERA and focus
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brought suit under MERA alleging that the proposed condemnation of
some marshland for construction of a highway would destroy the solitude of
the marsh, the natural assets of the area, and kill animal life in the re-
gion.' 80 The trial court dismissed the case for failure to sustain the burden
of proof. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, however, and ruled that
the plaintiff had met his burden. Since the marshland housed abundant
plant and animal life, timber, soil, and contained quietude resources, the
court ruled that constructing a highway would materially and adversely af-
fect the natural habitat. 18' The Minnesota courts have used a similar ap-
proach to the burden of proof in other cases.8
The Supreme Court of Illinois settled a dispute among the state appel-
late courts as to the burden of proof under the Illinois Environmental Pro-
tection Act.18 The Illinois Act contains four factors regarding the "unrea-
sonableness" of the defendant's conduct. 8 Some courts had required
on paramount concern for the state's natural resources. Abrams, supra note 21, at 122. See
State ex rel. Powderly v. Erickson, 285 N.W.2d 84 (Minn. 1979). Citizens sued under MERA
to enjoin city and owner of historical houses from demolishing the homes. The court stated:
"[Protection of natural resources is to be given paramount consideration, and those resources
should not be polluted or destroyed unless there are truly unusual factors present in the
case .. " Id. at 88.
180. County of Freeborn v. Bryson, 297 Minn. 218, 210 N.W.2d 290 (1973).
181. Id. at 228, 210 N.W.2d at 297; County of Freeborn ex rel. Tuveson v. Bryson, 309
Minn. 178, 189, 243 N.W.2d 316, 322 (1976). When the same parties challenged an alterna-
tive routing of the highway, also across the marshland, the Supreme Court of Minnesota again
issued the requested injunction:
To some of our citizens, a swamp or marshland is physically unattractive, an inconve-
nience to cross by foot and an obstacle to road construction for improvement. However, to
an increasing number of our citizens who have become concerned enough about the van-
ishing wetlands to seek legislative relief, a swamp or marsh is a thing of beauty. To one
who is willing to risk wet feet to walk through it, a marsh frequently contains a springy
soft moss, vegetation of many varieties, and wildlife not normally seen on higher ground.
It is quiet and peaceful - the most ancient of cathedrals - antedating the oldest of
manmade structures. . . .In short, marshes are something to protect and preserve.
Id. at 189, 243 N.W.2d at 322.
182. See Minn. Public Interest Research Group v. White Bear Rod and Gun Club, 257
N.W.2d 762 (Minn. 1977). The plaintiffs adduced evidence that a gun shooting facility dis-
turbed the peacefulness of the area and polluted nearby wetlands with lead shot. The court,
satisfied that the plaintiffs had sustained their burden of proof, concluded:
[Tihe Rice Lake wetlands area would, but for the club, otherwise be preserved perma-
nently and for future generations. . . . It is necessary to enjoin the trap and skeet shoot-
ing at the White Bear Rod and Gun Club in order to protect,,preserve and enhance for
the plaintiffs and the people of Minnesota generally the air, water, land, and other natu-
ral resources within the state. The plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law.
Id.
183. See Processing and Books, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 28 Ill. App. 3d 115, 328
N.E.2d 338 (1975), rev'd64 Ill. 2d 68, 351 N.E.2d 865 (1976). ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 , §§
1031-34 (Smith-Hurd 1977 & Supp. 1986).
184. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I11 , § 1033(c) (Smith-Hurd 1977). The four factors to be
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plaintiffs to present evidence on all four of these criteria to make a prima
facie showing of pollution.' 85 In response, the Illinois Supreme Court stated
that to hold the plaintiff accountable on all four of these factors would force
him to sustain a burden more stringent than the burden in a common law
nuisance action.'86 This would violate the objective of developing a program
whereby ordinary individuals can force polluters to bear the consequences
of their conduct.' 87 By lessening the required threshold of harm, the Illinois
Supreme Court aligned the interpretation of the statute with its purpose of
making it easier for individuals to seek and obtain relief for protection of
the environment.' 88
V. A PROPOSAL FOR INDIANA
This note has criticized the structure and judicial handling of IEPA.
Under IEPA the public is discouraged from pursuing environmental control
because of the administrative burden in the Act, while the judiciary has
evidenced its dislike of granting standing to citizens. As a result, neither the
judiciary nor the public plays an active role under IEPA, which directly
conflicts with the intended purpose of SEPAs. Ultimately, more polluters
escape accountability. To make the statute an effective tool for environmen-
use to evaluate the defendant's activities are:
(i) the character and degree of injury to, or interference with the protection of the
health, general welfare and physical property of the people;
(ii) the social and economic value of the pollution source;
(iii) the suitability or unsuitability of the pollution source to the area in which it is
located, including the question of priority of location in the area involved; and
(iv) the technical practicability and economic reasonableness of reducing or elimi-
nating the emissions, discharges or deposits resulting from such pollution source.
Id.
185. See Aurora Metal Co. v. Pollution Control Board, 30 III. App. 3d 956, 333 N.E.2d
461 (1975); Lonza, Inc. v. Illinois Pollution Control Bd., 21 Ill. App. 3d 468, 315 N.E.2d 652
(1974). But see Freeman Coal Mining Corp. v. Illinois Pollution Control Bd., 21 III. App. 3d
157, 313 N.E.2d 616 (1974), and Ford v. Environmental Protection Agency, 9 Ill. App. 3d
711, 292 N.E.2d 540 (1973) for cases not requiring evidence on all four factors concerning
"unreasonable."
186. Processing and Books, Inc., 64 III. 2d at 76-77, 351 N.E.2d at 869.
187. To require a plaintiff to prove all four factors would
place upon the complainant a burden more stringent than he would bear in a common
law nuisance action, and thus frustrate the purpose of the Act 'to establish a unified,
state-wide program supplemented by private remedies, to restore, protect and enhance
the quality of the environment, and to assure that adverse effects upon the environment
are fully considered and borne by those who cause them.'
Id.
188. Under Processing and Books, a complainant need not offer evidence on every fac-
tor in § 1033(c) of the Act to make out his burden of proof. This substantially eases the
burden on the individual seeking to abate pollution and brings the Act in accord with legisla-
tive intent. Note, The Illinois Environmental Protection Act: The Burden of Proof Becomes
Clearer, 53 CHI[-]KENT L. REV. 57, 76-77 (1976).
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tal control, judicial and public participation need to increase. To achieve
this, the Indiana statute should be amended and judicial interpretation of
the Act should be aligned with the objectives of SEPAs.
A. Removing the Requirement of Exhausting Administrative Remedies
First, the citizen's right and desire to participate can be enhanced by
removing the prerequisite of exhausting administrative remedies and pro-
viding direct access to the courts.'8 9 Environmental plaintiffs deserve a day
in court. Citizen input will be encouraged under the statute if action before
the bench is available.'90 Forcing plaintiffs to spend an unpalatable six
month waiting period for an agency to take action does not encourage citi-
zen input, as is evident in the nonuse of the current statute. 91 Removing
the requirement of exhausting agency remedies will allow environmental
decision-making to take place in the courtroom, a more neutral forum com-
pared to the politically-dependent administrative realm.9 2
After a plaintiff gains direct access to the court, the court needs
broader power under IEPA to resolve the dispute. In order to serve as a
check on agency behavior, IEPA should be amended to expressly allow the
court to consider administrative regulations asserted as defenses, in addition
to all of the other evidence in the case. The court should have power to
refuse to recognize the regulations as defenses when it deems them unrea-
sonable or ineffective for controlling pollution. A case-by-case factual in-
quiry should be employed, whereby administrative regulations can be
weighed along with other evidence and disregarded as defenses when
appropriate.
Under this change in IEPA, the court would check every standard set
forth as a defense. Giving the court this extended power will create an in-
centive for agencies to more diligently pursue their obligations.'9 The addi-
tion of judicial scrutiny will serve as a catalyst for more effective adminis-
trative behavior, and thus further the intended result of environmental
litigation generally and SEPAs particularly - protection of the
environment.1 94
A defendant under IEPA may also defend on grounds that no other
prudent and feasible alternative exists to replace his conduct. He must also
show that his activity is necessary for promotion of the public health,
189. See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
190. Id.
191. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 125-40 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 13-15 and 125-37 and accompanying text.
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safety, -nd welfare.1 9 5 This defense should be modified by adding that eco-
nomic considerations alone do not render a particular alternative unreason-
able or infeasible. This will ensure that potentially more expensive substi-
tutes to the polluting activity, which are also more environmentally sound,
are not eliminated solely because of cost.
Critics argue that allowing citizens direct access to the courts and giv-
ing the judiciary broad power to decide environmental issues, including re-
jecting agency rules, opens the floodgates of litigation."' They also argue
that such a liberal procedure places highly technical environmental issues
before a panel of generalist judges ill-suited to adjudicating complex, scien-
tific matters.197 Practical experience under MEPA, however, does not sup-
port these fears. MEPA provides the plaintiff with direct court access with-
out exhausting procedural remedies and grants the court power to
independently review agency standards as well as reject regulations when
they are unreasonable for achieving protection of the environment. 9
First, the Michigan courts have not experienced a flood of MEPA
suits.'"9 There is no indication that plaintiffs file frivolous suits and
fabricated claims under the statute. In fact, with the exception of a few test
cases, there has been very little sensational use of MEPA 00 As stated ear-
lier, typical MEPA litigation involves local problems: "patching a wound
here, tightening a screw there." 0 1
Furthermore, the Michigan judiciary proved that courts can handle
complex environmental issues just as they regularly deal with other compli-
cated litigation, such as anti-trust and patent cases. 02 In Irish v. Green203
195. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-6-1-2(a)(2) (West 1983 & Supp. 1987).
196. In Michigan, frivolous suits in which neighbor sued neighbor to avenge for earlier
losses in the administrative process were predicted under MEPA. Also, there was a fear that
those unable to discriminate true environmental problems from standard and acceptable re-
sults of a growing economy would file MEPA suits without merit. One long range result pre-
dicted from these abuses was clogging court dockets. DiMento, supra note Ii, at 424. See N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:35A-4 (West Supp. 1987) (New Jersey provision contains a clause concern-
ing frivolous suits drafted in response to similar fears).
197. Cramton, Citizens Suits in the Environmental Field - Peril or Promise?, 25 AD. L.
REV. 147, 151 (1973).
198. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1202(2) (West 1987).
199. DiMento, supra note II, at 428-29.
200. Id. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. See also Goldshore, supra note 163,
at 18. (The fear that the New Jersey SEPA would lead to a flood of litigation is unjustified.
On the contrary, there have been very few cases brought pursuant to its provisions).
201. See Sax & DiMento, supra note 54, at 12-13. See also DiMento, supra note I1, at
429.
202. See generally Rex Chainbelt Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 477 F.2d 481 (7th Cir.
1973) (patentee denied priority of invention where he had no conception of means to accom-
plish feed rate variation through voltage for a squirrel cage motor); General Plastics Corp. v.
Borkland, 129 Ind. App. 97, 145 N.E.2d 393 (1957) (court held evidence insufficient to estab-
[Vol. 22
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for example, plaintiffs challenged a housing development on an environmen-
tally-valuable section of Little Traverse Bay. After a five day trial during
which the court heard testimony from several dozen lay and expert wit-
nesses, including a transportation planning consultant and a micro-biologist,
the judge rendered an opinion representing an ingenious solution to the
problem."" In fact, the Supreme Court of Michigan even attached the
opinion in Irish as an appendix to another case as an exemplary judicial
response to a MEPA situation involving highly complex issues.205 Judges
competently handle many other cases involving complicated technical envi-
ronmental problems and can be expected to do so in the future °.2
Several authorities, in arguing against the establishment of a special
environmental court, focus on the excellent ability of existing federal and
state courts to deal with environmental issues.207 First, obscure scientific
issues are not usually presented in environmental cases. Common questions
concern evidentiary or procedural matters.20 8 Inevitably, the court will be
forced to balance the equities of the particular case as it does in deciding
lish that improvements contracted to license were new and useful improvements in plastic
products and in art of manufacturing such products); United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (court found sixty to sixty-four percent of defendant's
market share in aluminum market did not constitute a monopoly).
203. No. 162-63 (Emmet County Cir. Ct., filed July 15, 1972), discussed in Sax &
DiMento, supra note 54, at 10-1I1.
204. The judge set forth some general conditions to be considered before development
could proceed. The judge required that an access road be built to ease traffic burdens and that
appropriate devices be constructed to restrain the flow of surface water within the subdivision.
Id.
205. Ray v. Mason County Drain Comm'r, 393 Mich. at 314, 224 N.W.2d at 892-96.
206. See Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. Anthony, No. 2331 (Ottawa County
Cir. Ct., filed Aug. 2, 1971), discussed in Sax & Connor, supra note 16, at 1014. This case
involved a very extensive hearing regarding a motion to enjoin the Indians from their methods
of commercial fishing. The plaintiff presented a fishing expert who educated the judge about
the complex effects that the Indians' fishing would have on a local basis and beyond. With the
expert's help, the judge readily understood the environmental problem. See also Lakeland
Property Owners Ass'n v. Twp. of Northfield, No. 1453 (Livingston County Cir. Ct., filed
Aug. 27, 1970), discussed in Sax & Connor, supra note 16, at 1041. The plaintiffs challenged
present operation and plans for enlargement of a local waste water treatment plant. There was
extensive and detailed testimony in the case. The court ruled for the plaintiffs and even issued
new, more restrictive effluent standards and other alternative locations in which the defendant
could operate.
207. See Oakes, supra note 52. "It has been demonstrated that in most environmental
cases the number of 'environmental' issues is small and can be explained adequately to the
court in layman's terms. Therefore, the cry of the court's need of technical knowledge is not
founded on the practical experience of the agencies involved in environmental litigation."
Smith, The Environment and the Judiciary: A Need For Co-operation or Reform? 3 ENVTL.
AFF. 627, 635 n.50.
208. A typical question might be: "What do the facts show the effect of a given factor
(concentration of a given pollutant or use of a control method) to be on a given variable
(human health, or the survival of a certain form of wildlife)?"
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any other type of case. 209 Therefore, allowing the Indiana courts to overstep
the agency by evaluating agency rules will not present an impossible or
even an unusually difficult task for the judiciary. Secondly, with the use of
experts and cross-examination in the adversary system, judges can carefully
consider complex, scientific issues.210
Under the proposed reform of IEPA, the Indiana courts will be able to
scrutinize agency standards whenever they are asserted as a defense. Judi-
cial investigation alone will provide adequate incentive for agencies to dili-
gently and effectively perform their functions.2 1 ' Administrative rules will
be subject to evaluation in a court of law where they can be rejected if
unreasonable. Additionally, regulated defendants relying on compliance
with agency rules will be very unhappy when the court declares the rule
invalid and rejects it as a defense. Instead of applying political pressure to
set up lax regulations in their interests, 2 2 the potential defendants in Indi-
ana will be more concerned with viable and effective rules which will hold
up in court as a defense to their activities."' The public will also place
more pressure on agencies to promulgate rules to protect the environment
instead of the regulated businesses.
Furthermore, removing the requirement of exhausting agency remedies
from IEPA will not necessarily lead to a flood of lawsuits that the judiciary
is ill-equipped to hear. Instead, the absence of this obstacle will give the
environmental plaintiff a fair chance to be heard by an impartial tribunal
particularly suited to weighing contradictory policies.214 The Indiana plain-
tiff should be given an opportunity to prove that he can play an effective
role in improving the state's environment.2 1 Likewise, the judiciary should
take the responsibility for hearing and resolving environmental controver-
sies. Based on the poor record of the statute, the legislature and courts are
hardly in a position to turn down suggestions that have been successful in
other states.
209. Smith, supra note 207, at 639. See Rose v. Chaikin, 187 N.J. Super. 210, 453 A.2d
1378 (1982) (utility of defendant's conduct in nuisance case must be balanced against the
harm to the plaintiff).
210.
[Tihe current system of review by generalist judges already allows for the considera-
tion of the best technical expertise in the various areas of environmental concern. The
adversary system with introduction of expert testimony and careful cross-examination
allows for pretty careful examination of the most advanced technical knowledge about
the costs of a given polluting activity and the alternatives to that activity.
Oakes, supra note 52, at 555.
211. See supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 202-06 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 143-53 and accompanying text.
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B. Developing a Low Threshold of Harm
Once the procedural barriers are removed from IEPA, thereby al-
lowing the courts to hear more cases, the Indiana courts must use their
power carefully to ensure that the burden of proof is not set too high. Be-
cause virtually all human activity has some sort of adverse impact on the
environment, determining when certain conduct rises to the level of "signifi-
cant" pollution or impairment of-the environment is difficult. 1 In light of
the goals of SEPAs in general, the inaccessibility of the common law, and
the limited applicability of NEPA, however, the Indiana courts will pre-
clude facilitation of environmental concerns if they insist on a high thresh-
old of harm. 1
Under a high threshold, the relatively large environmental issues will
still be covered. However, the less newsworthy, local controversies will not
qualify as severe enough to be a violation of the statute, so the plaintiff will
once again be placed at the mercy of the common law to protect the envi-
ronment.218 Thus, the plaintiff will be essentially without a remedy in many
situations.2 9 As stated earlier, SEPAs are strongest in their application to
relatively small-scale, local concerns.2 2 0 If the Indiana courts insist on a
high threshold of harm, these types of issues will go uncorrected, at least
until they become so severe that they are beyond repair.2 2 1 Experience
under MEPA and MERA supports the argument that SEPAs should not be
restricted by a high burden of proof.2
22
Critics suggest that the use of limiting words such as "significant" are
a weakness in SEPAs because the language does more to confuse than to
help courts determine when there is sufficient damage to have a cause of
action.2 2 3 In practice, however, MERA and MEPA are interpreted to set a
low threshold of harm, even though the former statute contains limiting
language while the latter does not.2 2 4 Therefore, the Indiana judiciary can
develop a low threshold under IEPA despite the presence of the term
"significant."
Several courts have focused on how the modifying words in a SEPA
216. West Mich. Envtl. Action Council v. Natural Resources Comm'n, 405 Mich. 741,
760, 275 N.W.2d 538, 545 (1979) (court recognized that virtually all human activity could
harm the environment in some manner).
217. See supra notes 154-88 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 154-64 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 16, 39, 160, 166, 171-82, 187 and 188 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 156-64 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 165-82 and accompanying text.
223. Hatch, supra note 4, at 120.
224. See supra notes 168-88 and accompanying text.
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should be construed. Since one purpose of the Act is to provide remedies
beyond the common law, the Supreme Court of Illinois ruled that the bur-
den of proof in the Illinois Environmental Protection Act should be less
stringent than the burden in a common law nuisance action."' Therefore,
the court interpreted "unreasonably" as used in the statute to preclude tri-
fling, petty suits. 26
The Supreme Court of Connecticut also addressed the interpretation of
the word "unreasonable" that qualified "pollution, impairment, or destruc-
tion" in CEPA.2 2 7 Because the language of CEPA was borrowed in large
part from MEPA, the addition of "unreasonably," seemed to represent a
legislative effort to make CEPA less amenable to environmental plaintiffs
than MEPA.22 8 The Connecticut Supreme Court, however, found a much
narrower intent. The court interpreted "unreasonable" to eliminate harass-
ment or spite suits.2 29 Once a Connecticut court determines that the plain-
tiff is not bringing a spite suit, the operative effect of "unreasonable" is
exhausted."
Similarly, the Indiana Courts should interpret "significant" to preclude
only frivolous suits. Under such construction, citizens may invoke IEPA to
challenge local abuses, the typical and most successful application of
SEPAs. Securing IEPA from an unduly restrictive burden of proof is an
indispensable requirement before the Act can ever be effectively used to
protect the environment that it was meant to serve.
VI. CONCLUSION
The combination of burdensome procedural requirements in IEPA and
the judiciary's overly cautious and reluctant approach to the statute de-
stroys its purpose and effectiveness. Instead of encouraging citizen partici-
pation in environmental law enforcement and improvement of environmen-
tal quality as intended, the statute abandons the concerned environmentalist
in the politically-biased environmental agency where citizen input and the
public interest are often forgotten. Lack of judicial power to review admin-
istrative standards asserted as a defense also forces the Indiana courts to
surrender to agency control. The courts will predictably further emasculate
an already impotent statute by imposing a severe burden of proof under
225. Processing and Books, Inc. v. Illinois Pollution Control Bd., 28 Ill. App. 3d 115,
328 N.E.2d 338 (1975), rev'd 64 Ill. 2d 68, 351 N.E.2d 865 (1976).
226. Id.
227. Manchester Envtl. Coalition v. Stockton, 42 CONN. L.J. No. 45 (Sup. Ct. May 5,
1981).
228. See Molleur, CEPA Update: Manchester Environmental Coalition v. Stockton, 14
CONN. L. REV. 695, 708 (1982).
229. Stockton, 42 CONN. L.J. at 23.
230. Id.
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IEPA which will leave many local issues unaddressed. Consequently, Indi-
ana citizens, harmed yet remediless, helplessly watch their environment
deteriorate.
With several changes, however, IEPA can take its place on the front
line with other SEPAs. Removing the administrative prerequisite and giv-
ing citizens direct court access will open an avenue of citizen participation.
Requiring the judiciary to check agency standards will encourage more ef-
fective administrative action. Additionally, setting a low threshold of harm
will allow recourse against local, small-scale environmental abuse. These
changes will vitalize IEPA, making it an effective weapon in the Indiana
citizen's arsenal for fighting environmental destruction. Indiana's environ-
ment will emerge the victor.
MARY JANE RHOADES
Rhoades: The Indiana Environmental Protection Act:  An Environmental Weapo
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1987
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 22, No. 1 [1987], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol22/iss1/5
